

Current History



THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

Issues of the 1956 Elections

MILITARY POLICY AS A NATIONAL ISSUE	Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr.	193
THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC POWER	William E. Leuchtenberg	200
TAXES AND THE ECONOMY	Seymour E. Harris	206
FOREIGN AID AND AMERICAN POLICY	Norman Graebner	212
THE FARM ISSUE	Gilbert Fite	218
LABOR AND THE 1956 ELECTIONS	Monroe Berkowitz	223
SEGREGATION IN POLITICS	Bert Collier	229
THE CHANGING SOUTHERN VOTE	Dewey W. Grantham, Jr.	234
WORLD DOCUMENTS		
The Democratic and Republican Party Platforms, 1956		238
RECEIVED AT OUR DESK		247
THE MONTH IN REVIEW		249

Current History

Founded in 1914 by
The New York Times
Editor, 1943-1955:
D. G. REDMOND

OCTOBER, 1956
Volume 31 Number 182

Publisher:
DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.
Editor:
CAROL L. THOMPSON
Editorial Assistant:
JOAN L. BARKON
Promotion Consultant
MARY A. MEEHAN

Contributing Editors
ROSS N. BERKES
University of Southern California
ALZADA COMSTOCK
Mt. Holyoke College
PHILIP D. CURTIN
University of Wisconsin
DAVID DENKER
Rutgers University
SIDNEY B. FAY
Harvard University
MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY
Columbia University
NORMAN A. GRAEBNER
Iowa State College
HANS KOHN
City College of New York
DONALD W. MITCHELL
Military Historian
NORMAN D. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania
JOHN P. ROCHE
Brandeis University
A. L. ROWSE
All Souls College, Oxford
HARRY R. RUDIN
Yale University
FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williams College
RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE
University of Southern California
COLSTON E. WARNE
Amherst College

Editorial Advisory Board:
CARROLL G. BOWEN
EDGAR B. COALE
HELEN F. FAUST
ELISE F. JONES
J. PARRY JONES
ESTHER H. LEEDS
JOEL T. LOEB
J. GORDON LOGUE
NANCY R. POSEL
RAMON L. POSEL
J. R. WIKE, JR.

65 cents a copy; 7 dollars a year. Canada 7 dollars twenty-five cents a year. Foreign including the Philippines 7 dollars fifty cents a year.

Coming Next Month

West Europe Today and Tomorrow November, 1956

Next month, we shall turn our attention to the nations of Western Europe. The discussion of changing NATO highlights the fact that for the nations of Europe military security is not enough; they need an era of peace to develop higher living standards and economic security. In November, our readers will enjoy seven articles:

Hans Kohn, Professor of Government at City College of New York and author of "The Idea of Nationalism," and "Nationalism and Liberty, the Swiss Example," among other books, will draw on his rich background for a study of contemporary Germany.

Ross N. Berkes, Director of the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California, has just returned from a year of study in Great Britain, and will write on the United States and West Europe.

Alzada Comstock, Professor Emeritus of Economics at Mount Holyoke College, will discuss the contemporary position of Great Britain.

Edward W. Fox, Associate Professor of History at Cornell University, will write directly from Paris about French problems today.

Charles F. Delzell, in the History Department at Vanderbilt University, will analyze current Italian politics and the economic problems Italy faces.

Rhea Marsh Smith, Professor of History at Rollins College, will study the politics and economic conditions of Franco's Spain. A traveler in Spain in 1954, Dr. Smith has made an intensive study of Spain since 1931.

John H. Wuorinen, Executive Director of Columbia University's History Department, will highlight the most recent developments in neutral Scandinavia.

We should like to call to the attention of our readers our STUDY GUIDES and TESTS prepared for class or study group use with this October number on ISSUES OF THE 1956 ELECTION and with our August number on CHANGING AMERICAN POLITICS. The GUIDES and TESTS are available without charge with quantity orders of these issues.

Published monthly by Events Publishing Co., Inc. Publication Office, 108-10 Walnut St., Philadelphia 6, Pa. Editorial Office, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn. Entered as second class matter May 12, 1948, at the post office at Philadelphia, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright 1956, by Events Publishing Company, Inc.

Current History

Vol. 31

OCTOBER, 1956

No. 182

As the merits of the presidential candidates are evaluated this fall, several major issues will influence the voters. Here eight articles discuss the political implications of defense policy; public power; segregation; the farm issue; the labor issue; tax reduction, spending and the economy; foreign aid and American policy and the changing Southern vote.

"As an issue, defense policy has certain readily identifiable disadvantages. And of these the greatest is public ignorance of the problem."

Military Policy as a National Issue

BY EDWARD L. KATZENBACH, JR.

Director of the Defense Studies Program, Harvard University

A SHORT WHILE ago Senator Russell of Georgia, the usually scrupulously courteous Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, rose on the floor of the Senate to say some hard words about Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson. He said bluntly what he felt had to be said. He called the Secretary of Defense a man "whose vanity and arrogance have been exceeded only by his ineptitude." The language was reminiscent of that which the Republicans were using some four years ago about the Truman Administration's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.

Of course, the colorful Mr. Wilson is given to gaffes and is therefore a vulnerable political target. His aphorisms on his preferences as to dogs, on the Russians, and on the political motivations of the United States Congress have made him a political byword as well as a butt of Herblock cartoons and a popular cover man on the *Democratic Digest*.

But Mr. Wilson is more than a personality. He is at the same time a symbol, the focal point of political dispute. Like Secretary of State Acheson in the previous administration, he personalizes a party dispute. That it should be Mr. Wilson rather than

John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, who is so bitterly berated seems, initially, surprising. Can defense really be a party issue in 1956 when the man in the White House is, whatever else he may be, a popular five-star hero?

In retrospect there would seem to be three distinct points at which party attitudes towards matters of defense policy have changed since World War II. The first, immediately following the war, saw the re-emergence of disagreements between the legislative and executive branches of the government, but not of disagreements between the two parties.

The next, following the entry of the Chinese Communists into the Korean War in November of 1950, saw the issue of policy objectives in the use of military force boil up between the parties, while the dispute as to what military means we should retain subsided.

Finally, since the announcement of a \$5.2 billion dollar cut in defense expenditures immediately after the Republicans took office in 1953, the debate between the parties on policy has decreased, while the debate on the level of forces needed has increased. How and why did this happen?

In 1945, there was a consensus between the parties on military policy, as there was in 1940. On both occasions what argument there was ran to management rather than to basic policy: before the war the efficiency of the arms build-up was debated, after it the rate of demobilization. In both, the fire of the legislative body as a whole was directed against the Executive. This continued as the dimensions of the Communist crisis began to be recognized.

For example, neither the House nor the Senate considered President Truman's 1948 budget requests for the Air Force in any way sufficient. As a whole the legislative branch accepted the recommendations of the President's own commission, under the leadership of Mr. Thomas K. Finletter, and of a special legislative committee, both of which suggested the necessity for a 70-group Air Force instead of the then current 48. Despite the earnest pleas of Administration leaders for economy, only one Democratic vote in the House and one vote from each party in the Senate opposed the additional appropriations.

There were a number of reasons for this bipartisanship. Strong leadership was given the measure by members of both parties. There was sharp disagreement within the Democratic Administration itself on the adequacy of the budget—the then Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington was distinctly out of step with higher Administration officials. Doubtless, too, the voting for a larger Air Force on both sides of Congress was a balm for the twinges of conscience which some congressmen may have had when they turned down Universal Military Training, a pet hope of the President, and an issue that also crossed party lines. Besides, a vote for the Air Force was a vote for a kind of military power which had basked in popular favor regardless of party since the late 1930's.

Such was the traditional pattern of debate on matters of defense policy (except that it is more usual for Congress to cut an Executive request than to try to increase it). As with so many other programs, sectional differences have sometimes had as much to do with the voting pattern on defense matters in Congress as have party loyalties. To take

a random example, in the years preceding the Civil War the New England wings of both parties supported a strong Navy, and Southern Democrats, who were at the time eyeing the Caribbean with the green eye of envy, gave them their support. But when New England abolitionists began to back the Navy with a view to checking the slave trade, the Southerners tempered their nautical enthusiasm.

The parties have exercised no more than very general leadership, although one observer has noted that Southern Democrats, despite frequent references to the South as the most pro-military of the several sections of the United States, tended between World Wars I and II to vote *for* military measures when their party was in power and *against* them when it was not. And the parties themselves have rarely been far apart on what the military policy of the United States should be—with certain notable exceptions such as the election of 1900, when the Democrats, counting on the unpopularity of the war against the insurrection in the Philippines, nailed the most violently anti-military plank of our history to their national political platform. For the most part, however, when one party has not mentioned military affairs, the other has not mentioned them either. Moreover, what criticism one has offered of the other has been oriented toward management rather than policy.

Military Policy Becomes Partisan, 1950-1953

But after the entry of the Chinese Communists into the war in Korea in November of 1950 our military policy became in a new sense political. Certainly it was to be expected that the legislative branch would offer sharp criticism of military policy in Korea. A defeat such as United States forces suffered at the Yalu was a bitter blow to national pride. And, as has happened so often in our history—during the War of 1812, after the first Northern defeats in the Civil War, during the initial mobilization period in World War I—the legislative body reacted to the defeat immediately and emotionally, and along partisan lines.

The initial attack was led by Senator Robert A. Taft, the brilliant and contro-

versial Ohio Republican. It was directed against the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These he labelled incompetent, and because of his own position in the party the label stuck in Republican party ranks. All kinds of criticisms were leveled at the Chiefs—even though they were criticized for policies made at higher levels.

The Chinese Nationalists should have been used in Korea and against the mainland of China; more South Korean troops should have been armed and used; United States planes should have been allowed to bomb over the Yalu, and these should have been allowed to use atomic bombs—the criticisms of "Truman's War" were wide-ranging and enthusiastically flung about. Further fuel was added to the political fires which the Republicans were building with the recall of General Douglas MacArthur from the Far East and the hearings that followed.

It may be remembered that it was during this period too that the President's right to send ground troops to Europe was brought into question by an eager minority of Republican Senators, and that the wisdom of sending them was brought into question by former President Herbert Hoover. By campaign time, 1952, the idea seems to have been generally accepted, if one can take the statements made in House and Senate as a fair indication, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were actually making rather than implementing policy.

They were used as policy defenders by the Truman Administration both in public speeches and during such hearings as those on the Far East situation which followed MacArthur's return. This simply confirmed the Republican accusation that the Joint Chiefs were participants in Democratic policy-making, and hence should be considered political appointees. But if the Democrats could be accused of having Joint Chiefs who were political captives, can not the accusation be made in reverse with the installation of a completely new set of Joint Chiefs after the change of administration in 1953?

As administrations changed in 1953, the composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff changed too. And the man who had led the attack on the preceding military leaders had,

as one might expect, a hand in selecting the new ones. When asked by a friend whether he had chosen the new Chiefs, Senator Taft replied: "I wouldn't say *that*. But I will say that before a single new appointment was announced [Secretary of Defense] Wilson had me out to his apartment in the Wardman Park Hotel and showed me the list. I found it entirely satisfactory."

By the very token that these men were satisfactory to the Republicans, they were initially put in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the Democrats. However, as it turned out, it was the Democrats who supported the Chiefs of the services against the civilian secretaries and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Radford.

During the 1952 campaign, the Republican presidential candidate, Dwight D. Eisenhower, had two issues in the general area of defense policy. The first and infinitely more important had to do with the war in Korea. His promise to make a personal trip to Korea and to re-evaluate that grim, slow, and painfully grinding war seems to have been a major contribution to his success. The second issue was the promise of a less costly defense establishment. In his now famous Baltimore speech of 1952, candidate Eisenhower said: "But the big spending is, of course, the \$60 billion we pay for our national security. Here is where the largest savings can be made."

Since in 1952 the Republicans made political capital out of the "selling of 400 million Chinese down the river to Communism" and the "refusal" to "win" the Korean War, it might be thought that the Democrats would now be busy making an issue out of the failure of the present Administration to keep Northern Vietnam and the Tachens out of the hands of the Communists. But such is not the case.

Those who may be said to speak as partisan Democrats, Chester Bowles, Thomas K. Finletter and Dean Acheson himself, have been writing and speaking of the over-militarization of our foreign policy, not the reverse. They point to what they term our lack of flexibility in the conduct of foreign affairs, to the lack of an ideal, to the policy of "bluffs and back-downs" which they say is inherent in this Administration's emphasis

on a doctrine of "massive retaliation." (Parenthetically, whether the alleged new proposal of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to cut the armed services by 850,000 men will become an issue is not yet clear at this writing.) But a glance at the Democrats' *The Facts About the Ten Top Issues of 1956* gives one the impression that it is the administration of our military-diplomatic affairs, their conduct rather than their objectives, to which the Democrats object. The attack is generalized. The Democrats cannot write a platform around a single dramatic issue as the Republicans were able to do in their 1952 platform with respect to Korea.

Instead of concentrating on objectives, the Democrats have concentrated on means. Without an issue such as Korea, they have concentrated on the adequacy of our military preparedness. And the gist of their argument is that instead of spending less on our defenses we should be spending more. This is a new tack in United States politics.

How Force Levels Became an Issue

It was the \$5.2 billion dollar cut which the Eisenhower Administration made in the defense budget, and particularly in the Air Force, which gave the Democrats their first defense policy issue. The occasion was a dramatic one. The dying Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, testified on the setback which the new Administration's cut would give to the Air Force. But the new and dynamic Secretary of Defense who presumably knew the ins and outs of the production world testified that, on the contrary, Vandenberg was talking about "paper wings" and the planning was unrealistic from the production point of view. And the new set of Joint Chiefs, as they came into office, said hesitantly that the new appropriations requests could be lived with. The issue divided the parties almost as cleanly as a vote to organize.

The voting was partisan because the matter of force levels had become a matter of political faith, and so it has remained for the past several years. A motion to increase Defense Department appropriations over and above the Eisenhower Administration's

budget incorporating the \$5.2 billion cut was voted this way by the House: Yeas—156 Democrats, 5 Republicans; Nays—33 Democrats, 196 Republicans.

In that same year a vote in the Senate to increase the appropriation for the purchase of aircraft by \$400 million was defeated by a combination of 46 Republican and 9 Democratic votes. And during each succeeding year Republicans and Democrats have continued to split along similar lines.

In 1954, for example, an amendment to increase funds for the Army to permit raising the number of divisions from 17 to 19 had 79 per cent of the Democrats voting for the amendment and 98 per cent of the Republicans voting against it. A similar appropriation increase was voted in this election year by the Senate with comparable party solidarity.

Is Defense Policy Really an Issue?

As an issue, defense policy has certain readily identifiable disadvantages. And of these the greatest is public ignorance of the problem.

There are experts and counter-experts on taxation, farm policy, tariff policy, and, either through hard study or some form of divine revelation, foreign policy. But the experts on defense are almost all insiders. There is an aura of secrecy about defense, although this secrecy does not in fact have the dimensions it is frequently said to have. To the casual observer the details are frighteningly technical, even if the broad outlines are not.

And finally, the problems involved in defense policy are thought to be soluble by a combination of goodwill and open-mindedness.

One has only to note that when church vestries, the Supreme Court, Congress and university faculties are divided, the division is accepted as normal, honest and right, but when the military disagree, it is referred to as "bickering." This popular attitude makes defense policy a difficult one to bring before the public.

Although those in other fields of public policy will doubtless violently disagree, there seems to be rather more nonsense preached

in this area of public policy than elsewhere. The phrases "balanced force" or "preparation for the long haul," or "defeat through bankruptcy," or "the greatest force which we have ever had" are so misleading that even as slogans they are strange anachronisms.

Force, after all, can only be balanced with respect to enemy capabilities and what kind of force we would be willing to employ. One certainly prepares for military contingencies including a "long haul" but not excluding tomorrow. "Defeat through bankruptcy" ranges well outside the peripheries of most economists' concepts of the possible. And "the greatest force we ever had" is totally irrelevant in the absence of reference to that which the enemy currently controls. Given a general acceptance of military policy as too technical and too secret for public discussion, defense policy can be and is sloganized to the point of meaninglessness.

This in turn makes the generalized assurances of President Eisenhower that much more reassuring. Democrats may point to the fact that Mr. Eisenhower's view on the level of necessary defense spending in the period immediately before the outbreak of war in Korea was about as inadequate as was that of the Truman Administration's Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. They may also point out that the revolution in weapons has made the President's own experience in military affairs less meaningful.

But a sampling of influential congressmen in both parties indicates that from their experience there is a low level of national interest in the problems of defense, and that the President's own record as a military man seems guarantee enough that all is well in the Pentagon. Why then have the Democrats persisted in their efforts to make defense policy a national political issue?

The answer is basically that important Democrats think the issue important. Senator Stuart Symington (D.-Mo.) was formerly Secretary of the Air Force. Although presently under attack in his own district by Albert E. Schoenbeck, a candidate for the Republican nomination for United States Senator, for being the "pal of the munitions makers," the Senator feels that the handling of defense problems has been less than ade-

quate, that military advice has been ignored in the interests of a balanced budget, and that the evidence should be placed before the public. Senator Henry M. Jackson (D.-Wash.), a man with long experience in the Congress and a position of some authority from which to speak, namely the chairmanship of the Military Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, feels likewise. So does Senator Russell.

Such a triumvirate working together serves to set the tone in party policy. Their efforts have been seconded by influential Democrats presently out of office, former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter, former Under Secretary of the Army, Archibald Alexander, and others.

Moreover, the separation of powers and the peculiar responsibility of Congress "to raise and support armies," "to provide and maintain a navy," and to make rules for the governance of both puts Congress in a position to take a line independent of the Executive. Congress does so even though the Administration in power is of the same party as that which controls the House and/or Senate.

It may be remembered that Senator Harry S. Truman's investigations of the Roosevelt Administration's handling of military affairs in World War II made the Senator a senator's senator, and this in turn led to his being chosen Vice-President. More recently, Senator Lyndon Johnson (D.-Tex.) made a notable record investigating the Truman Administration's defense policies during the Korean War. While gaining his influential position as party leader in the Senate he may, however, by supplying fodder for the Republican critics of the Truman Administration, have helped to make himself the minority rather than the majority leader of the Senate in the 83rd Congress.

In short, because the Defense Department has no constituency, but only multiple constituencies based on defense spending, a congressman can make a career from criticism of military administration—which accounts, in part at least, for the fact that there are on occasion as many as 30 congressional subcommittees investigating defense matters independently and simultaneously.

Whether Senator Symington and his colleagues are or are not creating an issue, they are most certainly gaining a reputation within the party which may have considerable future repercussions on defense policy.

But on what information can a criticism of defense policy be made when the President as Commander-in-Chief presumably controls the tongues of officers as he controls their swords?

Candor is hardly the characteristic of any administration. But in this one it has become an issue in itself. While it is generally recognized that lining up the team in a solid phalanx is desirable, the Democrats are claiming that the Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration is pushing the "cover-up" to the point of national insecurity.

General Matthew B. Ridgway, the Democrats point out, has complained bitterly that "the pressure brought upon me to make my military judgment conform to the views of higher authority was sometimes subtly, sometimes crudely, applied." Only recently, also, one of the most brilliant and able of the young generals in the Army, Brigadier-General Loyal C. Methany, requested retirement in circumstances which indicate that the request was forced. General Methany's picture had appeared in an article in *Time* magazine which insinuated that he had been one of those who had leaked an Army document to the press. Only a few days before, Mr. Wilson had said on leaving a White House conference: "We'll see who sticks his neck up next. It might be a little dangerous." Given the circumstances, there seemed little doubt in critical minds that the Secretary had seen to it that life in the Pentagon had been made unbearable for the general.

It is this, as well as those now famous documents which Secretary Wilson had circulated in the Pentagon stating that information to be given out would have to be cleared for constructiveness, that has made the Democrats feel that the Secretary's genial evasiveness has a greater significance than the ordinary give and take between the executive and the legislative bodies.

The Republican National Committee has of course simplified and generalized its defense of its Administration's defense policies.

This is to be expected of an incumbent administration which can place the burden of proof on the accusers.

The Democratic National Committee, on the other hand, has listed in *Fact Sheet* after *Fact Sheet* and in a number of long articles in the *Democratic Digest* the contradiction in testimony not only between appointed officials within the Administration but also between high-ranking officers and Defense Department civilians.

These accusations have been given factual substance in the testimony given before Senator Symington's subcommittee by high-ranking officers within the services and also by such vocal critics of the Administration as Mr. Trevor Gardner, formerly Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development in the incumbent administration, who resigned in protest against its reduction of expenditures in this area. The testimony is there to read for anyone who cares to do so. How widely it will be read is another matter. And how widely it will be believed is another again.

In summary, then, the issue of defense policy is presently one which revolves around the question of the adequate level of spending for military contingencies. But note those vital issues that are left out: the question of whether the organization for decision-making is all that it should be, the question of a further unification of the services; and, more important than any of these, that question which can be most hotly debated of all of what the future of war is likely to be.

In conclusion then it would seem that defense policy cannot become a bread and butter political issue until such time as it is generally considered to be as well within the public comprehension as are other policies. And this it would seem is a matter of public education.

Edward L. Katzenbach has served as Research Associate, Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. He is the author of several articles on politico-military affairs for magazines and scholarly journals.

ONLY WAY TO GET All World News Every Week— Indexed for Quick Fact-Finding



FACTS O
WORLD NEWS DIGEST

Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.
Vol. XVI, No. 795

Published Weekly in 4 Sections

YOU GET THIS NEWS
DIGEST EVERY WEEK

MIDDLE EAST

UN Condemns Israel

The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Jan. 19 the Western-sponsored resolution condemning the Israeli raid on Syria Dec. 11, 1955.

The measure adopted by the Council charged Israel with "a flagrant violation" of the Council's 1948 Palestine cease-fire resolution, the 1949 Syrian-Israeli armistice agreement and "Israel's obligations under the [UN] Charter." It called upon Israel "to comply with its obligations . . . in the future, in default of which the Council will have to consider what further

FACTS ON FILE
VOL. XVI, No. 808

Week in Headlines

Section II • April 18-24, 1956

Bi-W.

+ THIS CUMULATIVE INDEX
EVERY OTHER WEEK

under U.S. GOVT.
For specialized United Nations
agencies see under UNITED
NATIONS.
For foreign cities see under
country concerned.

AANDAHL, Fred George
Dem. score rd. our program 3-26,
112F3
ABDULGANI, Ruskin
In Indonesian City 3-24, 122F1
ABBAS, Men of 3-24, 122F1
ACCIDENTS
Men of Yr. 4-10, 124C3
11 die in Peru landslide 4-14, 124A7
6 Marines drawn 4-18 124-124A7

ALLEN, George Venable
Delay on Israel armistice 3-28, 111F1
ALLEN, Harry
British executioner 3-31, 121G1
AMERICAN Assn. of University Pre-
scribers
Cigarettes calls for custers 4-4-47,
121A4
AMERICAN Farm Bureau Fed.
Shuman vs. bill 4-7, 120D1
AMERICAN Radiator & Standard San-
i-tex Corp.
Acquies Mulling Mfg. trust suit filed
114E-F3
AMERICAN Scientists, Fed. of
5 more AEC on fallout mutations 2-27,
110F1
AMERICAN States, Act of Ciudad Tr-
115B1
AMERICAN Theater

Leaps on fallout danger
Gromyko for H-3 test 4-18, 111F1
British sets for May 3-5
Industrial & other:
E Germans plan plant 3-
Intl. Cooperation 3-
U.S.-Sov. pact signed 3-11
ATTLEE, Earl (Clement Attlee)
Made Knight of Garter 4-
W.H. AAU 100-yd freestyle
AUSTRALIA
Involved in 3-31
3 places
3 actions 4-
... and they
become this
Encyclopedia

NEWS FACTS AT YOUR FINGERTIPS, UNSLANTED, UNBIASED DRAWN FROM EVERY MAJOR NEWS SOURCE

LOCATE LAST YEAR'S... LAST MONTH'S...
YESTERDAY'S NEWS FACTS—IN SECONDS!

Now — throw all those news clippings, newspapers, magazines, and messy files right into the waste basket! Now — let FACTS ON FILE cover the current news for you, pin-point past news facts for you in seconds! Used and proven priceless by thousands of individuals, companies, newspapers, radio networks, businesses everywhere in the world.

"Unique" — "Indispensable" — "A Lifesaver"

Each week FACTS ON FILE's veteran newsmen digest and index the vital news of the world from 4,004 newspapers, hundreds of magazines, press releases and out-of-the-way news sources. Every Friday night the NEWS DIGEST is mailed to you with all the news of the past seven days — eight 8½" x 11" pages containing 1,100,000

words expertly reduced to 10,000. Then, every two weeks you receive the INDEX containing every name, date, fact and quotation indexed and cross-indexed . . . material that grows into a complete file of the year's news on every subject indexed for instant reference.

AN AMAZING SPECIAL FOF OFFER

Prove what FACTS ON FILE can mean to you by mailing the coupon. You get complete service through December 31, 1956 plus back copies from July 1, 1956, plus a Deluxe spring binder (total value \$35.00), for just \$6.00! And — if at the end of your trial subscription you are not fully satisfied, we will refund your \$6.00. But — we cannot hold this offer open indefinitely, so we urge you to mail the coupon today!

THE FAMOUS FACTS-ON-FILE ADVISORY BOARD

Prof. A. J. BARNOUW, *Letters*
Dr. E. C. BRENNER, *Medical Science*
Prof. F. W. COKER, *Political Science*
Prof. J. ANTON DE HAAS, *Economics*
DAVID DIETZ, *Science*
Prof. H. D. GIDEONSEN, *Education*


REPRESENTATIVE OF SUBSCRIBERS

Standard Oil Co.
DuPont
Western Union
Drew Pearson

Army, Navy, Air Force
The Hindu, Madras, India
Young & Rubicam
AP, UP, INS, INP

Time, Life, Fortune
NBC, CBS, MBS, ABC
Yale, Harvard
United Nations Library

FACTS ON FILE 119 West 57th Street, New York 19, N. Y.



MAIL NO-RISK COUPON NOW!

FACTS ON FILE, Dept. 106-10
119 West 57 St., New York 19, N. Y.

Please send me the complete FOF service (News Digests, Cumulative Indexes and Binder) through December 31, 1956; plus back copies from July 1, 1956, for the special price of just \$6.00. I understand that if I am not completely satisfied at the end of the trial I may return the material for a full refund.

Name

Address

City, Zone, State

Check enclosed Please bill me

THIS OFFER VALID FOR NEW SUBSCRIBERS ONLY

"If the Pacific Northwest states hold the balance of power in the 1956 elections, the next president of the United States will be the man who chose the right side of a debate over a remote and improbably named canyon of which millions of Americans have never heard," writes this author, noting that "Public power becomes important as a determinant of voting behavior only where a special interest is affected."

The Issue of Public Power

BY WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG

Associate Professor of History, Columbia University

WHEN GENERAL EISENHOWER entered the White House in January, 1953, as the first Republican President in 20 years, he announced that he would reverse the policies of Roosevelt and Truman in the field of public power and resources development in favor of a policy of "partnership." Declaring that the public power policies of the Democratic party placed too much reliance on the federal government in Washington, Eisenhower promised that he would return a great share of authority to state governments and to private business.

The new President lost little time in carrying out his promises. He reduced the authority of the Department of the Interior to build transmission lines and slashed funds for the Rural Electrification Administration. He appointed to the Federal Power Commission and other major resources agencies men who were unsympathetic to federal regulation and who were close to the viewpoints of private interests like the power

companies; in particular, he denied Gordon Clapp reappointment as head of the Tennessee Valley Authority and named General Herbert Vogel in his place. Most important, he drove through Congress the tidelands oil bill, which granted control of resources in the "tidelands" to the states, upsetting a decision of the United States Supreme Court which held they belonged to the federal government.

When Congress passed the tidelands bill, Democrats cried that Eisenhower was running a "giveaway" administration, but they made little political capital with the cry because the tidelands law pleased the gulf states far more than it alienated inland states which seemed too remote to be affected. Even more important, the tidelands bill was passed with the support of a number of Southern Democratic senators. For many months, the Democrats watched helplessly while Eisenhower reversed one after another of the cherished policies of the New Deal and Fair Deal, unable to arouse any great popular indignation or to turn these acts to their political advantage. Then came the Dixon-Yates affair, and the situation dramatically changed.

The Dixon-Yates controversy grew out of the greatly expanded needs for electric power, produced in large part by the great demand for power to operate atomic energy plants producing fissionable material. When the Government built an atomic energy plant at Paducah, Kentucky, it counted on obtaining power from the T.V.A. (Tennessee Valley Authority), but in an astonishingly short period of time, the demands on

William E. Leuchtenberg has taught at Smith College and Harvard University and, in the summer of 1956, at the Seminar for American Studies in Salzburg, Austria. His doctoral study, *Flood Control Politics in New England*, was published in 1951; he testified about the 1955 floods before the special legislative committee that held hearings in Springfield, Mass. He is working on Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal for *Harper's New American Nation series*.

T.V.A. power became so great that the T.V.A. could not provide enough power both for the atomic plant and for the increased needs of its own customers.

In 1953, the T.V.A. asked for money to build a steam plant at Fulton, Tennessee, a few miles north of Memphis, to meet the increased need for power, but Eisenhower's Bureau of the Budget refused to grant the T.V.A. the money, because it was opposed to any increase in the T.V.A. domain, and particularly to T.V.A. steam plants.

This was the situation at the beginning of 1954; there would soon be a great need for more electric power for the Government's atomic plant at Paducah, but Eisenhower's officials had refused to let T.V.A. do anything about it. Admiral Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, proceeded to negotiate with private utilities to build a plant in or near Paducah, but no one was interested because there was little market for power in Paducah save for that provided by the federal government. Strauss then met with Edgar Dixon, the President of Middle South Utilities, who operates in Arkansas, a long way from Paducah, on the other end of the T.V.A. power network.

Dixon talked to the Atomic Energy Commission and to the Bureau of the Budget; the Bureau of the Budget decided that Mr. Dixon needed the co-operation of another firm, and they brought in Eugene Yates, President of the Southern Company. After months of negotiations, the A.E.C. worked out a contract with Dixon and Yates signed on November 11, 1954. On November 18, it received the approval of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee by a straight party vote with ten Republicans for, and eight Democrats against.

Contract with Dixon-Yates

Under the contract, Dixon and Yates agreed to build a steam plant at West Memphis, Arkansas, at a cost estimated at \$107,250,000; it would sell power from the plant to the Atomic Energy Commission and the A.E.C. would turn it over to the T.V.A. Since T.V.A. would have an additional supply of power, it would then be able to turn over surplus power at the other end of the

line to the A.E.C. plant in Paducah. In short, Dixon and Yates did not actually arrange to deliver any power to the A.E.C.; they agreed to sell power which would enter the T.V.A. system so that the T.V.A. would be free to deliver power to the atomic plant.

Why did they go through such a complicated arrangement? Because Eisenhower would not let T.V.A. build its own plant, because no private company was willing to build a plant near Paducah, and because Dixon and Yates were willing to build the Arkansas plant since there was a great market for power in the Memphis area in addition to the power bought by the Government.

Friends of the T.V.A. were infuriated by the Dixon-Yates deal. They argued that the contract was a "giveaway" to a favored company, that the contract had been let out without any competitive bidding, and that the negotiations had been conducted in secrecy. They declared that the profits to the Dixon-Yates combine would be excessive, amounting to nine to eleven per cent, and that Dixon and Yates would be getting this huge return without any risk; in short, that the Government was guaranteeing Dixon-Yates a profit.

They pointed out that Dixon and Yates were putting up only about five per cent of their own money; that the A.E.C. would assume a heavy burden for additional costs, if the plant cost more than Dixon and Yates estimated; and that the A.E.C. would reimburse the company for taxes. They asserted that West Memphis was a terrible place for a steam plant, that it would be built on a bad foundation on a site menaced by floods.

Finally, they argued that Dixon's firm had a bad past record. Senator Kefauver declared: "I hold that Middle South Utilities comes to this government to receive an overly generous gift with unclean hands." Dixon's company, Kefauver continued, was one "run by dummies, controlled by absentee landlords, and levying tribute on the people of a Southern state for the benefit of Mr. Dixon and his cohorts at 2 Rector Street in New York."

The Administration replied that there had been no possibility of negotiating with anyone but Dixon, since he was the only one

operating in the area; hence, there could be no competitive bidding. Further, they replied that the profits would not be excessive, that the combine would be taking a risk, and that the site had been approved by engineers. When the Dixon-Yates contract received the approval of a series of government agencies and of Congressional committees, there appeared to be no possibility that the Democrats could prevent the construction of the plant. But they refused to admit defeat, and continued to pry into the details of the contract negotiations, about which the Eisenhower administration was maintaining a suspicious secrecy.

Early in 1955, the Democrats struck gold. In February, 1955, Democratic Senator Lister Hill of Alabama unearthed the name of Adolphe Wenzell, hitherto unmentioned in the proceedings, and whose name, it developed, an Eisenhower official had deliberately stricken from an account of the proceedings. Wenzell, it was learned, had participated in conferences in the Budget Bureau, at which Dixon was present, as a government official at the same time that he was making arrangements to finance the plant as an employee of the First Boston Company.

Once the name of Wenzell entered the controversy, the Dixon-Yates project was doomed. The Democrats raised the cry that the contract was void because of the "conflict of interest" doctrine that a man may not serve both the Government and an interested private party at one and the same time. When on June 23, the Memphis City Council voted to construct its own power plant, Eisenhower was relieved to be able to seize on this as an excuse to cancel the contract.

However, he continued to argue that Wenzell's role had been proper throughout. When newsmen asked him on July 6 whether he still maintained this position, he replied, "Indeed, yes." The President was not able to maintain this position for long. In November, 1955, Eisenhower was forced to concede that, because of the role of Wenzell, the contract had been void from the start.

On July 11, 1956, Eisenhower's Department of Justice wrote the final chapter in the Dixon-Yates affair by filing a brief in

the United States Court of Claims which, *The New York Times* noted, read at times like "a Democratic campaign flyer." The Dixon-Yates combine had sued the Government for over three million dollars for repudiating the contract, and the Justice Department replied that the Government owed Dixon-Yates nothing, because the contract had been null from the beginning.

The brief contradicted an official opinion by Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gave sufficient statutory authority for the contract; said the joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee had acted illegally in 1954 when under Republican control, but correctly in 1955 when under Democratic control; and adopted the Democratic charge of "conflict of interest" with respect to Wenzell.

Thus the Dixon-Yates affair, the most important attempt of the Eisenhower administration to launch a new departure in public power policy, ended as a total fiasco with the Republicans not only soundly thrashed by their Democratic opponents but the object of the fury of the private utilities as well for bungling the contract negotiations, and refusing to recompense Dixon and Yates.

Niagara Falls

The Dixon-Yates affair was a smashing victory for the Democrats; it helped them in the 1954 Congressional elections but it did not wholly serve the purposes of the Democratic party in seeking a campaign issue, in part because the affair was too complex for the average voter to follow, in part because the 1956 elections were still many months ahead. Democratic leaders, determined to push Eisenhower into the open as a foe of public power, decided to force the issue in two separate areas—Niagara Falls and Hell's Canyon.

Democratic Senator Herbert Lehman of New York had sponsored a bill which would permit the New York State Power Authority to build and operate a hydroelectric power plant at Niagara Falls to produce \$60 million a year in low cost power. Eisenhower opposed the Lehman proposal, and favored instead letting the Federal Power Commis-

sion determine who should build the dam.

What this really meant was that Eisenhower was opposed to construction of the dam by a public agency, and wanted the F.P.C. to grant a license to a group of private utilities instead. Moreover, Eisenhower vigorously opposed the provision in the bill giving co-operatives and publicly-owned distribution systems preference in the distribution of Niagara power, although this type of preference clause dates back to the Reclamation Act of 1906 under Teddy Roosevelt and has been affirmed over and over again, notably in the Tennessee Valley Authority Act.

In late June, 1956, the Niagara Mohawk Power Company, realizing that there was no hope of private development of the site, proposed to go along with the Lehman bill if the Senate would strike out the preference clause and guarantee the company the use of 500,000 kilowatts of power for the next 50 years, but Democratic leaders vigorously opposed any compromise. By July, 1956, the Lehman bill had passed the Senate and had been reported out of committee in the House, but was tied up in the House Rules Committee by a 6-6 division.

Six of the eight Democrats on the committee favored the proposal; opposed were two Southern Democrats and all four Republicans. Although it appeared that the bill might die in the House Rules Committee, Speaker Sam Rayburn still hoped to get Representative Howard W. Smith of Virginia, Chairman of the Committee, to change his vote, and permit the bill to come up for consideration before the 1956 election.

Hell's Canyon

Much more important than the Niagara project was Hell's Canyon, the last great hydroelectric power site left in the United States. It is the deepest gorge on the North American continent, a canyon of the Snake River in Idaho almost half a mile deeper than Grand Canyon. The Truman administration wanted to develop this site by building one mammoth dam at Hell's Canyon so high that it would create a lake in back of the dam 93 miles long.

Opposed to the Truman administration

was the Idaho Power Company, which wanted to build three smaller dams, and applied to the Federal Power Commission for a license to do so. Advocates of the federal dam argued that it would produce far more power at half the cost. When spokesmen for the Idaho Power Company protested that the region should be developed by "local interests," Democratic senators retorted that the Idaho Power Company was a Maine corporation dominated by big Eastern investment houses.

Republicans in Congress blocked Truman's efforts to pass legislation for a great public power dam in Hell's Canyon and when Eisenhower took office, he threw his weight behind the Idaho Power Company. On August 10, 1955, the Federal Power Commission granted the company a license to develop Hell's Canyon.

Undismayed by the decision of the F.P.C., the Democrats, under the leadership of Wayne Morse, went ahead on a bill for federal development of the Hell's Canyon site. When the bill appeared stalled in committee, pressure from Democratic National Committee Chairman Paul Butler forced the bill to a vote.

Butler was convinced that the Democrats had to make a record on the bill, or they would not be able to make an issue of "giveaway" in the campaign. Butler hoped that Congress would pass the bill, and expected that Eisenhower would then veto it, thus giving the Democrats a dramatic campaign issue. By late June, Republicans were conceding the bill might pass, but when the Hell's Canyon bill came to a vote, eight Southern Democrats bolted their party to join an almost solid Republican delegation in defeating the bill. The Republican vote against the bill was produced by intense White House pressure, possibly the most intense of any single bill of the Eisenhower administration.

The defeat of the Hell's Canyon bill appeared to mark the final triumph for the private utilities in their war against the public power policies of the Democrats. Twenty-four hours later, their jubilation turned to gloom when the House Appropriations Committee voted to appropriate a huge sum for the construction of federal atomic

power plants instead of continuing the Eisenhower policy of private development of atomic power.

Democratic leaders attempted to make the issue still sharper by assailing Admiral Strauss for causing the American atomic power program to fall three years behind that of the Soviet Union because of Strauss' insistence on relying on private companies, but a Virginia Democrat, Representative J. Vaughan Gary, forced the Democrats to strike these remarks from the report.

Despite their defeat on the Hell's Canyon bill, around which they had planned to build their whole campaign in the West, the Democrats are determined to make a campaign issue of their contention that the Eisenhower administration is a "giveaway" government dominated by special interests.

In making this charge, they are hampered at every turn by the Southern wing of the party. Southern Democrats voted for the tidelands bill, were tying the Niagara bill up in committee, provided the votes to defeat the Hell's Canyon bill, and prevented the party from making a partisan issue of the atomic power program. Under the circumstances, it may be hard for Democratic leaders to draw party lines on the public power issue.

At best, not many votes will be changed by the public power question. The average voter of Grand Rapids or Trenton has not followed the intricacies of the Dixon-Yates negotiations, nor is he keenly aware of the cost of electric power, or the way it affects the economy and possibly his livelihood. When he enters the polling booth, he will cast his vote for other reasons than a sense of concern about the public power issue.

Public power becomes important as a determinant of voting behavior only where a special interest is affected. In upstate New York, Eisenhower may be hurt by his stand on the Niagara question, but this is problematical. In the Tennessee Valley country, the Dixon-Yates issue will certainly damage the Eisenhower cause.

In the 1952 campaign, Eisenhower scouted

reports that he was opposed to T.V.A., but today it is clear that he is a foe of T.V.A., and this will impair his chances of carrying Tennessee, as he did in 1952, and the other valley states. Yet even in the Tennessee Valley, issues like Democratic party unity and civil rights will prove more important than Dixon-Yates in determining the outcome of the election.

The one area where the public power issue will be crucial is the Pacific Northwest. The symbol of Eisenhower's resources policies, Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay, resigned to run for the Senate seat in Oregon now held by Democrat Wayne Morse. Before McKay's resignation, Democratic Senator Richard Neuberger of Oregon demanded his recall, and he was joined in this demand by Senator William Langer of North Dakota, a maverick Republican.

Senator Morse called McKay "the worst Secretary of the Interior since Albert Bacon Fall," a none-too-subtle attempt to link McKay with Harding's Secretary of the Interior who was sent to a Federal penitentiary for his role in the Teapot Dome oil scandal. McKay and Morse have made the Hell's Canyon issue the battlefield of their campaign, and on the response of Oregon voters to the Hell's Canyon dispute may hinge the outcome of the election.

This is even more true in Idaho where Republican Senator Herman Welker's seat is in danger; Welker led the fight against Hell's Canyon. To a lesser extent, this issue will figure in Democratic Senator Warren Magnuson's campaign for re-election in the state of Washington.

So intense is concern over the public power interest in this area that much more than three Senate seats may turn on the issue. If the Pacific Northwest states hold the balance of power in the 1956 election, the next President of the United States will be the man who chose the right side of a debate over a remote and improbably named canyon of which millions of Americans have never heard.



BOOKS

FROM CALIFORNIA

Africa's Challenge to America

By CHESTER BOWLES

Introduction by Thomas K. Finletter

A penetrating analysis of the problems of Africa and its place in the East-West struggle, with suggestions for a new U. S. foreign policy. The first book to deal with America's relations to Africa.

144 pages

\$2.75

German Exile Politics

By LEWIS J. EDINGER

A pioneer study of the attempt by the exiled remnants of a once powerful and disciplined party to organize a revolutionary movement against a totalitarian dictatorship.

346 pages

\$4.25

They Remember America

By THEODORE SALOUTOS

The story of repatriated Greek-Americans, why they return to their homelands, how they react to their native country after living in America, and the impact of their return upon Greece. Told through a series of life histories.

172 pages

\$3.50

Higher Learning in Britain

By GEORGE F. KNELLER

A comprehensive study of British university education in the period following World War II, from an American professor's point of view, showing how university thought, practice, and administration have been affected by postwar conditions.

314 pages

\$6.00

At your bookstore or

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Address: Berkeley 4, California

When it comes to the question of public finance: "The Republicans stress the importance of incentives, and they hold that heavy taxes tend to discourage investment." Because the Democrats hold that "Some changes are more important than finance," they disagree with Republican fiscal policy and "contend that the remission of taxes should directly benefit the consumer."

Taxes and the Economy

BY SEYMOUR E. HARRIS

Professor of Economics, Harvard University

1. The Revolution in Fiscal Policy

IN THE midst of the Great Depression in 1932, with about 12 million unemployed, the then Speaker of the House, Congressman Garner, requested any member of the House who would not balance the budget, if he could, by raising taxes and cutting expenditures to rise and be counted. Not a single member of the House arose.

Twenty-two years later a Republican Administration introduced a tax bill which saved the taxpayer \$710 billion—this time in the midst of a slight recession, with unemployment relative to numbers on the labor market only one-fifth as high as in 1932.

Here indeed is a revolution. Not that every well-placed Republican believes in modern fiscal policy—certainly Mr. Hoover's views are not greatly changed from those of 1931-1932 when he raised taxes and cut public expenditures on the theory that what mattered was business confidence. In order to instill confidence he would reduce the

total amount of spending—as though confidence and spending were independent variables. Nor do I mean to assume that every Democrat, playing an influential part in both taxes and spending policy, has not been attracted to these theories.

It is not even clear that the President and his main advisors, inclusive of the persuasive Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Budget (of early 1956), and the scholarly Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, are clear on the issues involved. In 1954, they gave the disseminators of the modern theory much hope, for they supported a cut in taxes just when such cuts were likely to do some good. Taxpayers with less cash siphoned off by the government could now spend more on consumption and investment.

Indeed, the Democrats insisted that their main objective was to spare the rich taxpayer who had always supported the Republicans, and surely this was a crucial consideration for an administration friendly to business. The Democrats have also claimed that the cut in taxes had been prepared by them; in fact the major reductions to take effect later were already on the statute book in 1952. But whatever the merits of this debate concerning credit, the fact remains that the tax reduction supported by the Republicans helped contain the recession.

2. Modern Fiscal Theory

Economists for years have been urging the government to cut taxes and increase spending in time of depression and increase taxes and cut public outlays in time of prosperity.

Chairman of the Harvard Department of Economics, Seymour E. Harris has been a member of the faculty since 1922. He is the editor of *The Review of Economics and Statistics* and the author of 25 books on economics, including *Economics of New England*. Consultant many times to governmental agencies, he is the Chairman of the New England Governors' Committee on the New England Textile Industry.

This is a simple theory and needs some elaboration. In a prosperous period like 1955 or 1956, one must be cautious lest any large reduction of public spending brought on by fiscal policy shorten a period of prosperity and prematurely bring on a depression.

Again, it is well to remember that other weapons are available to government besides fiscal policy. In the pre-depression days almost the only potent weapon available was monetary policy. A boom was confronted with higher interest rates and hence less money for spending; a depression with the manufacture of money and a reduction of interest rates, the latter presumably tempting the businessman to borrow. It was the failure of monetary policy to pull Western countries out of the quagmire of depression that reduced confidence in monetary policy and attracted attention to fiscal policy in the years after the 1929 collapse.

In the last few years, authorities have once more begun to look with favor on monetary policy, this time to deal with inflation. It has, however, not always been successfully used in recent years. In 1953, when those in charge wrongly diagnosed the situation as an inflationary one, the Burgess high money rate policy almost brought a collapse in the bond market and helped bring on the 1953-1954 recession; and, in 1955, excessive reliance on monetary policy and neglect of fiscal policy by the British prolonged a crisis of serious proportions.

3. Confusion on Tax Policy, 1956

What should be the fundamental determinants of the level of taxation? An obvious answer is that taxation should be at a level to raise employment and output to the highest possible point without paying the penalty of a large dose of inflation relative to the gains of output. The Eisenhower Administration deserves some criticism for confusing the issues in 1956. The President did not seem to be aware of modern theories of fiscal policy in the Report of the President on the State of the Nation, in the Budget Address, or in the Economic Report—the three most important economic documents issued in 1956. He was prepared to cut

taxes; but only if the cut could be achieved without unbalancing the budget and increasing the national debt.

The President was strongly supported by Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey and his chief Economic Advisor, Dr. Burns. What these high officials were in fact saying was that the objective of tax policy should not be maximum output or high employment but the prevention of a rise of the national debt.

This is indeed a surprising theory in the year 1956. Is the size of the national debt so important? Has the country suffered in the last 20 to 25 years during which the national debt has risen from about \$25 to \$275 billion? Or has not this increase in debt contributed to the spending without which our record prosperity would have been impossible? Is it common sense to worry so about the national debt when the above rise of debt was accompanied by an increase of the gross national product from \$56 to \$387 billion (\$126 to \$387 billion in stable prices) and the cost of financing the debt rose by \$5 to \$6 billion, or about one-sixtieth of the rise of G.N.P.?¹

Surely there is something wrong if the government would put the size of the debt above the material needs of the nation. Even since the end of the war, the size of the national debt has been reduced by one-half relative to the size of the G.N.P., which has to bear the cost of financing the debt.

In 1956, the debate over tax reduction continues. The Democratic members of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Economic Report insist that the decisive principle should be tax reduction if a decline threatens, irrespective of whether the budget is unbalanced. The Committee on Economic Development, a liberal businessman's group, urges tax reduction in 1956 if a substantial surplus in the cash budget occurs. The Administration does not budge from its position that no tax cut will be proposed so long as a substantial surplus does not appear.

4. Tax Reduction or Rise of Public Outlays

The Republicans and Democrats are at odds on another and related issue. An

¹ Gross National Product.

alternative to tax reduction as a means of stimulating the economy is a rise of public expenditures. In the early stages of the formulation of new fiscal theories the emphasis was on increased expenditures to get a country out of a depression. But increasingly the stress has been shifted to tax cuts as the appropriate approach.

The reasons are obvious. Tax cuts are easier to introduce and bring faster results than a rise of public expenditures and especially public investments. Furthermore, the party that prides itself on being a businessman's administration would share the prejudice of businessmen against public spending particularly when public spending suggests competition with private enterprise, as, for instance, in the development of hydroelectric power.

5. Attitude Towards Welfare Outlays

Actually the Eisenhower Administration has preferred cutting taxes to raising public expenditures. One of its major but questionable achievements was to cut military spending by \$10 billion. Yet despite a large decline in military spending and a tax cut of \$7 to \$10 billion, the Administration also cut welfare outlays. The best over-all index of these outlays is civil benefits, and the average amount spent in this category in the fiscal years 1954-1956 was less than in 1953. A critic of Republican policy might well ask why were not some of the savings made through tax cuts and reduction of military spending used to expand welfare outlays, which in recent years have absorbed a declining share of the nation's output of goods and services.

The trend in the spending pattern of Americans in the last few years is striking indeed. In the three years 1952 to 1955, outlays on durable goods (automobiles, television sets, and so forth) rose by almost \$9 billion or one-third, residential construction by \$5.5 billion or one-half, and total consumption by \$34 billion. In this same period, G.N.P. rose by \$42 billion (probably \$50 billion by the end of 1956).

Yet the federal outlays on schools, health, housing, natural resources and so forth in toto tend to decline. Experts have estimated

the backlog of school construction at \$10 billion and a need of \$30 billion in ten years; an annual educational operating school budget of \$15 billion is required against the \$10 billion now available. The present pace of slum clearance promises a solution of this problem in no less than 100 years. Despite the progress made under the Hill-Burton Act of the early postwar years, there is probably a greater shortage of hospital beds now than there was eight years ago when the program began to operate.

Petty economies have been followed by increased losses associated with hurricanes, and inadequate spending on flood control was accompanied by losses of about \$1 billion in 1955—experts from the Army Engineers claimed that in many instances serious losses through floods might have been cut by as much as two-thirds had planned projects been carried through.

Indeed, the government has shown a great enthusiasm for road building. Few would deny the need for more roads. Yet the federal government now is to spend \$25 billion additional on interstate roads in 13 years or almost \$2 billion additional per year over 1956 outlays. Total governmental outlays on new road construction are to rise by more than 100 per cent. Critics of this program may ask the following questions:

Are roads so much more important than housing and schools?

If the government can afford to spend several billion dollars additional on roads per year, cannot the government also afford to increase its outlays on welfare programs and especially on health, education, low-rent housing and slum clearance by an amount of equal proportions, say, one per cent of G.N.P. or \$4 billion per year? Surely we would want to spend \$5 billion out of the additional \$50 billion of G.N.P. (not to mention the \$8 to 10 billion of tax savings) on social welfare programs. As incomes rise—and they should—by \$100 billion in the next ten years, then we may ask for \$10 billion of additional welfare outlays.

Assuming no rise in military outlays, the resultant gains of \$25 billion in tax revenues out of \$100 billion additional G.N.P. might be used to ease the tax burdens by \$15 billion and increase welfare outlays by \$10

billion so that these expenditures at least maintain their place in the economy. Such policies would be in contrast to those of the first Eisenhower Administration when the gains of an advancing economy were concentrated on the taxpayer who, in comparison with the beneficiary of social outlays, is relatively well-to-do.

6. Welfare Outlays and National Income

In one respect, current policies are shortsighted. Better housing, help for institutions of higher learning, sickness insurance, an adequate school construction program (and the \$1.6 billion four-year program *turned down* in July, 1956, is not adequate), the elimination of slums, low rent housing, acceleration of programs of flood control, subsidization of comprehensive private health insurance, a genuine depressed area program, federal aid for current outlays on schools as a means of getting teachers' salaries up to a level where talent may be attracted—all of these might well, and most probably would, raise income a multiple of the additional expenditures and hence should yield in added tax revenues the additional outlays made.

7. The Distribution of Tax Burden

So far we have concentrated largely on the use to which additional income should be put. Tax reduction? Increased outlays? Types of outlays? And we have analyzed the relation of tax policy to the general economic situation.

These are perhaps the major issues. But there are others of some importance. An important one is the distribution of tax burdens. Once it is decided that taxes are to be cut, the question arises: "whose taxes?" The Democrats have been critical of the Republicans because the tax cuts in their view favored the businessman and the well-to-do much more than the small taxpayer. At various times the Democrats have proposed a higher exemption, which, of course, would be costly in revenue and would especially help the small taxpayer; they have mentioned a \$20 tax rebate for all taxpayers or a differential normal rate favoring those in the lower brackets.

In the 1940's there was a marked improvement in the distribution of income, with those in the lowest quintile increasing their real income by more than 42 per cent and those in the highest quintile only by 8 per cent. But there has been no such improvement in the last three or four years. Perhaps the major explanation of the improved distribution was the progressive tax programs which the Democrats had introduced in the 1940's.

In contrast, the Eisenhower tax program cut taxes for corporations and individual income taxes rose. Thus from fiscal year 1953 to fiscal year 1956 (estimated) federal corporate taxes declined by \$2.4 billion or 11 per cent, individual income taxes by \$350 million or 1 per cent. Yet corporate profits before taxes rose by \$7.2 billion or 20 per cent.

Here we find a difference in the philosophy of the two parties. The Republicans stress the importance of incentives, and they hold that heavy taxes tend to discourage investment. They also prefer to cut taxes for business and the large savers on the theory that with more savings and investment, incomes will rise and part of the gains will trickle down to the many.

Democrats contend that the remission of taxes should directly benefit the consumer. Increased consumption would stimulate investment. They are not concerned excessively with incentives on the theory that despite the large increases in taxes since 1929—with taxes three times as heavy relative to income as in 1929—income is nevertheless more than twice as high as in 1929 (in stable prices). They are also aware, as studies by Professors Butters and Thompson have shown, that despite the high tax rates on high incomes and especially marginal rates going up to 91 per cent, the maximum rates paid, except by a small minority, do not rise above the 50 per cent level.

The wealthy taxpayer finds all kinds of loopholes: capital gains taxes (much lower rates than income); inflating business expenses; generous depletion allowances; and so forth. One expert, Dr. Pechman, has shown that if the loopholes and special privileges allowed under the income tax alone were eliminated, the tax rates might

be cut by one third. The result would be the same revenue for the government but a much more equitable distribution of taxes.

8. The Progressivity of the Tax System

Democrats, in particular, have been concerned that the tax system is not as progressive as it seems, despite the apparent heavy progressivity in the income tax. Thus Professor Musgrave has shown the effective rate on taxes (allowing for the incidence of the tax, that is, where it falls) in 1954. (See Table I.)

It will be noted that the progressivity is not so high as is generally assumed. The reason in large part is the regressivity of state and local taxes. (Regressivity holds when taxes are generally a smaller part of higher incomes.) Yet in recent years and particularly since 1952, state and local taxes have tended to become a larger part of the total tax bill. (See Table II.)

9. The 1956 Campaign Issues

The Republicans will claim credit for a balanced budget; for a large tax reduction;

for economies in government; for getting more out of the military dollar; for taking into account the relation between tax rates and incentives; for putting across a monumental road program.

What will be the lines of attack of the Democrats?

(1) Some things are more important than finance, they will contend. Governor Stevenson has already said that drastic cuts in military spending to provide resources for cutting taxes had proved costly in the loss of prestige abroad. He has also criticized the Administration for niggardly allocations for welfare programs.

(2) In general, the Democrats will stress the disproportion in the use of additional resources for tax cuts, in particular for tax cuts favoring business and the large taxpayer and the failure to maintain a reasonable relation between national output and expenditures for health, housing, education, natural resources, slum clearance, and so forth.

(3) They will stress the confusion in Republican fiscal policy. They will want to

TABLE I
INCOME AND EFFECTIVE TAX RATES, 1954

Incomes	SPENDING UNIT INCOME (\$)							Total
	0- 2,000	2,000- 3,000	3,000- 4,000	4,000- 5,000	5,000- 7,500	7,500- 10,000	Over 10,000	
% TAXES TO INCOME								
Federal	15.7	17.9	19.1	20.0	22.2	24.2	33.2	23.8
State and Local	11.2	10.4	9.8	9.8	9.1	8.8	7.7	9.1
All	26.9	28.3	28.9	29.8	31.3	33.0	40.9	32.9

Source: Joint Committee on Economic Report, *Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability*, November 9, 1955, p. 98.

TABLE II
TAXES AS % OF NATIONAL INCOME, 1946, 1952, 1955

	(Calendar Years)	
	<i>Federal</i>	<i>State and Local</i>
1946	20.6	5.6
1952	24.4	7.9
1955	20.9	9.2

Source: Joint Committee on Economic Report, *The Federal Revenue System: Facts and Problems*, 1956, p. 143.

y after 25 years of persistent school-Eisenhower Administration still adheres to the pre-depression theory that the aim of tax policy is to balance the budget instead of to contribute towards the reduction of unemployment and also the growth of the

hey will ask the voter to bring
over a party that has strengthened
1 by using taxation as a weapon
ing a more equitable distribution
—in contrast to what they conceive
publican policy—tax favors on be-
ie rich.

other criticism of policy in 1952-
relate to the pattern of spending
nment. Why, the Democrats will
he government underwritten a few
ditional each year for roads and
the total of welfare outlays?
President presented large pro-
e not been underwritten
finance by the Secretary
r the Director of the
want to know whether
Secretary of the Treasury is
es or determine military and
olicies.

ally, they will want to know why
inistration imposes increased re-
ties on state and local government
the fiscal situation of these govern-
erorates vis-a-vis the federal gov-
The Democrats will also inquire
g the responsibility of President
er for the recommendations of the
ommission which so often urges
local responsibilities for policy
ce.

en on the balanced budget, they may ask some embarrassing question: Has it taken four years to balance the budget? Have the Republicans really merely sold assets like mortgages and commodities and used the money to give an impression of a balanced budget? The Democrats will also point out that from 1946 to 1952 former President Truman cut the national debt by \$12 billion in the next three years President Eisenhower increased the debt by

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

at a recent News Conference, replied to questions about renovating the Republican party by talking about **CHESTER BOWLES'** new book ***American Politics in a Revolutionary World.***

ADLAI STEVENSON

after reading it, said of **CHESTER**

BOWLES' new book, "American Politics in a Revolutionary World" enormously enlarged edition, published in 1956, shows the major cycles of expansionism through freedom in our history."

As November approaches, it is important for you, too, to be aware of the problems that America's leaders must meet.

AMERICAN POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY WORLD

By Chester Bowles

\$2.25 wherever books are sold



HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

"If the issues raised by foreign aid are powerful and clear, it seems doubtful that they will be debated with sufficient weight and candor to enlighten a nation or alter the course of American foreign policy."

Foreign Aid and American Policy

BY NORMAN GRAEBNER

Associate Professor of History, Iowa State College

QUESTIONS of foreign aid have dominated the public debate on foreign affairs in this election year. This is laudable, for the down-grading of military solutions to world problems since the Summit conference of July, 1955, has demanded the development of a cohesive, long-term American foreign economic program. No other aspect of current policy can respond quite as adequately to the needs of a world that desires above all the avoidance of war.

At issue has been not merely the amount and nature of foreign aid, but the continuing structure of Western collective security. Yet despite the significance of the issues involved, the debate of recent months has done credit neither to the intelligence of the American people nor to the astuteness of their leadership. Instead, it has illustrated strikingly the immaturity of American foreign policy, especially in the Far East.

Since 1955 the challenge to American complacency has been clear and disturbing. Recognizing the significance of Geneva—that since nothing dare be settled by war it must be settled by negotiation, diplomacy, and accommodation—the Kremlin leaders entered the past twelve months with a running start and have continued to reveal amazing agility and vigor in their "new look" proposals which stress peaceful co-existence with the West.

Norman A. Graebner is the author of *Empire on the Pacific* and *The New Isolationism*. He is Visiting Professor of History at the University of Illinois, 1956-1957. He has written several articles for historical journals.

Having earlier created the image of a ruthless nation, guided only by calculations of sheer power, the Russia struck a new pose designed to impress a world living in dread of war. Through the use of economic aid and propaganda, she has set out to attract the countries of Asia and Africa, divide the free world, and isolate the United States. This new trend in Russian policy culminated early in 1956 with Bulganin's offer of a treaty of friendship with the United States.

Pursuing this new program, Russia has become a disturbing factor in the Far East, exploiting Arab nationalism, the procurement of Czech arms, and, with her new emphasis on trade and technical assistance, offering aid to Egypt in building her cherished Aswan Dam. In the United Nations the Russian representative has adopted a pro-Arab and anti-Israel stand. During November and December, 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India, Burma, and Afghanistan, presenting Soviet trade and economic assistance and attempting to make the West appear weak and intransigent.

By February, 1956, Bulganin was offering trade and economic help to Palestine on the condition that it withdraw from its military commitments to the United States. The Soviet Union has invited all neutralist nations to join the "Soviet peace bloc" which, with a population of 1.5 billion people, constitutes a majority of the earth's population.

In this vigorous drive for economic change with the Far and Middle East, the Kremlin has found its essential ally in the West in Russia's own long-term production. Nations of the world can really use the surplus

rice, rubber, and wheat which the Asian nations hope to exchange for Western goods. Burma, for example, after rejecting United States economic aid, accepted a Soviet trade agreement whereby the Soviet bloc would buy 400,000 tons of Burmese rice per year for four years.

Thailand, an ally of the United States, has been watching such deals with envy. By similar arrangement the Kremlin has agreed to purchase Egyptian cotton. India has bought large quantities of Russian steel and cement; it is estimated that by the end of 1956 there will be 500 Russian experts on Indian soil. Czechoslovakia has replaced England as the chief source of locomotives and cars for the Indian railroads.

The range and scale of Soviet trade with Asia and the Middle East is small compared to that of the West, but Russia's totalitarian methods make the challenge acute. And in such key areas as India, Afghanistan, and Egypt the Russian promise of capital loans far exceeds the one-year allotments of the United States economic assistance program.

Only with hesitation did the Eisenhower administration move to counter this new Soviet challenge, for its continued inflexible posture toward the Soviet bloc and its reliance on military alliances ruled out any broad appreciation for economic measures. Not until early 1956 did Secretary of State John Foster Dulles officially recognize the new Soviet economic drive. Only when the Russian offers appeared threatening did President Eisenhower broach the subject of not only how much foreign aid, but for how long.

"We should be able to assure the nations of the free world," he said, "that we will continue to participate in particular non-military projects and enterprises which will take a number of years to complete." His foreign aid request to Congress totaled \$4.9 billion, of which four-fifths was earmarked for military and economic aid to nations which had signed pacts with the United States. This left about \$800,000,000 for economic assistance to the neutralist countries of the world.

But Congress was in no mood to accept the administration's proposals. By June the House Foreign Affairs Committee, headed

by South Carolina's popular James P. Richards, had lopped \$1.1 billion from the request. Pressures which had been accumulating against heavy foreign expenditures suddenly erupted. Much of the drama and high purpose of previous years were no longer present.

Much of the Republican leadership in Congress had never been convinced of the value of the program, and many Democrats had lost interest in carrying the administration's foreign policy program through Congress. Shocked at Pentagon bookkeeping, committee members were convinced that unused appropriations of previous years gave the Defense Department all it could spend in two and one-half years. With the nations of Europe reducing their defense exertions precipitously, Richards warned the Administration against "sending good money after bad."

Faced with this rejection of his proposals, the President sent General Alfred Gruenther, retiring head of NATO, to argue the Administration's case. To ten Republican and Democratic House leaders summoned to the White House (for the latter their first invitation to a purely legislative discussion), he termed the cuts "destructive" and a "dangerous threat" to American security. At a news conference the President added: "There is no amount of money that you can pour into bombs and missiles and planes and tanks and guns that will assure you peace." It is more profitable, he said, to spend for "constructive things that tend to make people respectful of the great values that we are supporting."

But nothing the President could say would restore the bill to its initial amount. Richards chided Sam Rayburn and Joe Martin for supporting the Administration. "They don't know anything about this bill," he told the House. "All they know is what they are told down at the White House. They have surrendered to the Executive Department without facts or figures. [But] we've come up here with what we think is a good bill for the security of the U. S." Whatever its form, the foreign aid bill was at best a stop-gap measure to give the national leadership time to re-study the basic issues involved.

Russia's new offensive demanded the re-casting of the nation's foreign aid program into realistic terms, but the administration has not met the challenge and has dissipated its advantage—to the distress of the bipartisan leaders who have favored foreign aid and to the delight of the isolationists. It has not raised the questions that would have given meaning to an expanded world economic program. Nor has it unified its foreign aid expenditures into one over-all policy.

Into the vacuum created by this failure of leadership poured a torrent of unreasoned, extreme proposals on the one hand and the current forces of moderation and complacency on the other. It is never difficult in times of peace to assure the American people that taxes are too high, that the defense budget can be reduced, that the nation's external problems are resolving themselves.

With the nation revealing little but boredom with the entire subject of foreign affairs, only vigorous leadership from the Executive could prevent Congress from widening the gap between "normalcy" and the Soviet threat. Such leadership alone could counter the popular inclination toward moderation and explain the need of expanded foreign aid in terms that Congress and the American people could understand.

Neutralism

Nothing illustrated so strikingly the intellectual barriers preventing the Administration from formulating an imaginative foreign aid program as did its stand on neutralism. It must be remembered in granting economic assistance that the military commitments demanded or the political strings attached can be as important as the amount contributed. For if the approach is objectionable, the offering of aid can well do more damage than good. Asian nations require Western capital for their economic development, but they harbor an inordinate pride and are determined to seek their own destiny. Any effort to infringe on their liberty of action quickly reveals how bitterly they resent any attempt to push them around.

Vice-President Richard Nixon recognized

these simple facts six months ago in his address before the *New York Herald Tribune* Forum when he defined the purpose of foreign aid as that of making neutralist nations such as India strong enough to be independent of any foreign domination. "To cut off aid or to put strings on it," he admitted, "will never win India to our side. It is more likely to have the opposite effect." At his press conference on June 6, 1956, President Eisenhower again recognized the fallacy of demanding military or political commitments as the price of American aid. Neutralism, he said, was an acceptable policy for any nation. It was neither immoral nor necessarily unwise for a country to avoid military pacts. Nor did it signify indifference "as between right and wrong or decency and indecency."

Nixon again confirmed this new trend in American policy statements in his thoughtful commencement address at Lafayette College. Nations newly-freed from colonial ties, he pointed out, "might wish the time and freedom to build their countries economically, politically, and culturally." Russia's recognition of neutralism, her example of industrial progress, and her respect for Asia's drive toward racial equality left the United States no choice but to accept the neutral countries as moral and spiritual equals. "The uncommitted nations," he concluded, "are not going to be frightened into alliances with the West by military power, nor can their allegiance be purchased by dollars."

If these new attitudes won the approbation of writers and editors throughout the United States, they were soon challenged vigorously both by those members of Congress, led by Senator William F. Knowland, who demand that American money be spent where it will buy allies and by allied nations who believe that their military pacts give them special access to our Treasury.

Immediately the Administration began to demur. At Iowa State College on June 9, Dulles hurried to set matters straight. "The principle of neutrality," he said, "pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others. This has increasingly become an obsolete conception, and except under very excep-

tional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception." Unfortunately Dulles' generalizing overlooked the fact that the neutralist countries included Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, Austria, and Finland in Europe; India, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon in Asia; all the Arab states of the Middle East except Iraq; and most of Latin America. Clearly the Administration required a further definition of policy.

Nixon closed the gap between the views of Eisenhower and those of Dulles in his address in the Philippines on July 4, when he averred that there were good and bad neutrals. "We cherish . . . the friendship of . . . nations who share our dedication to democracy . . . even though they have not seen fit to ally themselves with us," he observed. "But [toward the] brand of neutralism that makes no moral distinction between the Communist world and the free world, we have no sympathy." David Lawrence, the noted neo-isolationist, termed Nixon's speech "the best answer to neutralism that has been made."

At Karachi, Pakistan, the Vice-President warned Asian nations against taking aid from Russia: "Soviet aid is not given with strings but with a rope. Any country taking assistance from the Soviets runs almost certain risk of having that rope tied around its neck." But he repeated that the purpose of foreign aid is to help countries maintain their independence and that American aid would not be withdrawn necessarily if Soviet aid were also accepted.

It was doubtful if such conflicting attitudes within the Administration would do much to cement America's ties to Asia's teeming millions. Nehru of India accused both Nixon and Dulles of opposing the democratic way of life by their intolerance toward the views of others. At Karachi Nixon retorted, "Anyone who suggests Communist assistance is not inconsistent with freedom has not been reading history correctly." A. M. Rosenthal of *The New York Times* staff in India predicted that Nixon's remarks would provide controversy in Asia for months, while Dorothy Thompson added that "the value of this peripatetic diplomacy is open to question."

In practice American economic policies

were far more consistent and tolerant toward the neutrals than the new Dulles-Nixon view would indicate. The administration continued to favor aid for Yugoslavia, India, and other neutralist nations. In late July, however, it withdrew its offer to help Egypt build her Aswan Dam. Dulles chose to accept a calculated risk to test the Soviet intention and capacity to carry out its proposed economic program.

This halting search for a proper American relationship to neutralist countries was more than the administration's effort to find a working arrangement with powerful forces within the Republican Party. It was basically an attempt to define its attitude toward nations who refuse to regard the Communist bloc with the same moral indignation as does the United States. Assuming that any country gives evidence of its moral disapproval only when it signs a pact against Russia or continental China, Dulles proceeded to indict all nations who were not aligned militarily with the United States.

But since the neutralist nations were so diverse that a blanket indictment was impossible, Dulles was compelled eventually to contradict the President again, as well as the Vice-President and himself. In a press conference in Washington he agreed with Nixon that not all neutralism was immoral. He criticised only those nations which had no concern for others, but admitted that concern for others could be demonstrated by membership in the UN. Switzerland did not belong, but he would not regard it immoral because it had been neutral for so long.

"I think there are very few, if any [immoral neutrals]," he added, "although I also believe this: that countries which denounce genuine collective security pacts are seeking to promote a somewhat wrong view of neutrality." Dulles who in June accused all neutrals of immorality agreed a month later that there were no neutrals who were immoral.

The Failure in Understanding

This futile struggle over foreign aid and neutralism was the unavoidable result of the Administration's past inability to recognize the real challenge to the Western position in

the Orient. Only in Korea has the West been confronted with direct military aggression. Elsewhere the threat to the *status quo* has been essentially a revolution of rising expectations springing out of the indigenous conditions of poverty, alien rule, and the struggle against white supremacy. This Asian nationalism has ever been characterized by a quest for equality—racial, political, and economic—with the peoples and nations of the West.

Nationalism has determined the success of all recent political movements in the Orient. It has unleashed such force that alone it would have produced the recent Asiatic upheaval had communism never existed. Wherever in Asia Communist regimes have triumphed or threatened to do so their leaders have been forced to speak as nationalists and not as Communists. These are simple, widely-recognized facts, but they continue to baffle American leadership, and this bafflement continues to jeopardize America's relations with the Far East.

In a sense it is strange that this nation should reveal so much difficulty in comprehending or appreciating the nature of the Asiatic upheaval, for it is little but the twentieth century version of this nation's early struggle for freedom and equality. On the other hand this American misunderstanding is as explicable as it is disturbing, for the attitudes of the United States toward Asia since 1950 have been persistently corrupted by its China policy.

With few exceptions, students of the Far East have never accepted any doctrine but that Chiang Kai-shek's fall was produced by the nationalistic expectations of the Chinese people. But those who continue to attribute the collapse of the Kuomintang to a combination of American subversion and Russian aggression are forced to deny the very existence of nationalism as the determining force behind change in China.

This poses a crucial question: how can one deny the force of revolutionary change in China and still account for the upheaval in Asia and Africa? Certainly no one would accuse the United States Department of State for the independence of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, or Indonesia, or the civil war in Indochina. But with an iron

logic, the American posture toward China has forced American leadership, from fear or from conviction, to ignore the tides of nationalism in Asia. Changes which have affected the American people most seriously could not have stemmed from revolution and from treason simultaneously. If one accepts the latter interpretation (or at least performs in office as if he does), then he must logically reject the former.

This misunderstanding demands a high price in the performance of American policy, for any reasoned attitude toward foreign aid and neutralism in Asia is thoroughly incompatible with American views toward China. Again the dilemma in American policy stems from the persistence of its moral inflexibility. For matters of economic policy are rational only in a world in which allies, goodwill, and accommodation outweigh military might, alliances, and diplomatic obstinacy.

Nor has any pressure from Europe or Asia succeeded in modifying the American posture toward continental China or in easing its commitments to the Nationalists on Quemoy and Matsu. No longer does the President anticipate the overthrow of the Peiping regime by any means short of war; yet his administration continues to avoid any *modus vivendi* with the present Chinese government.

Dulles has continued to warn the world that this nation will not betray Chiang or give up the offshore islands. President Eisenhower repeated these assurances to the Generalissimo in July, 1956, when he reaffirmed "our own steadfastness in continuing to support the Republic of China." The real cost of this policy was not in Asia's disapproval but in the underestimation of Asian nationalism which it perpetuates.

American policy toward China has determined the second important aspect of United States relations with the Far East. Having accepted the rationale that the threat to Asia has been external aggression rather than internal revolution, the Eisenhower administration has had no intellectual choice but to place its emphasis on military alliances. Unfortunately this accent on military pacts appears strangely out of harmony with a continent that believes atomic war

avoidable if only tensions can be reduced.

And since it likewise discounts the significance of nationalism in Asia, it beclouds the role which foreign aid might play in creating a genuine balance of power in the Orient. For any substantial limitations in Asia on Chinese aggressiveness must rely primarily on the moral, political, and economic strength of the neutralist nations who have denounced the American alliance structure.

Increasingly, the threat of atomic destruction has convinced much of Asia, the Middle East and even Western Europe itself that the military edge between the two power blocs must be blunted and that a neutral or "third force" stand between the United States and the Soviet Union is the best guarantee of peace. Sir Anthony Eden suggested this course for England in his recent speech before Parliament. Asia's spokesmen believe that United States military pressure in Asia, as represented by SEATO, perpetuates Chinese aggressiveness. Thus neutralism is in essence the reaction of young nations to foreign policies that demand military alliances and that appear to be substituting power for diplomacy.

To Asians this nation's excessive faith in military power is further evidence of an American premise that communism rather than nationalism comprises the real challenge of that continent. Whereas the sensitive new governments of Asia regard the threat of communism remote, their memory of Western colonialism remains vivid. United States military alliances appear as Western interference in the local affairs of Asia. American military aid to Pakistan, supposedly to build United States security in Southeast Asia, has been deeply resented by nationalists in India and Afghanistan.

For its illusory military alliances in Asia the nation has paid a heavy political price. Neither SEATO nor the Baghdad Pact add much material strength to the West, and it is doubtful if even the signatories have much interest in them except as they open an entering wedge to the United States treasury.

American military policy in the Far East has been a failure both in military terms and in political consequences. So effectively have the SEATO and Baghdad pacts been undermined by the growing opposition of

neutralist countries in their respective areas that a re-appraisal has become necessary. So completely do they ignore the real forces of Asia that any concessions to neutralism could well cause both alliance structures to crumble. American foreign policy in the Orient reveals immaturity because the concepts on which it is founded, as illustrated by both its inflexibility toward China and its accent on military alliances, must deny the essential importance of the only forces that give a non-military program any real validity—nationalism and its by-product, neutralism.

American foreign aid policy in the past has been wasteful because of its resulting political aimlessness. It has persistently measured success in technical and economic terms rather than political. It has aimed at military preparedness which substitutes military for political goals. It has sought recipients among friendly nations which it has defined in military terms. It has functioned through established regimes, helping to maintain them in power although other alternatives may have been in the American interest. Instead of seeking objectives in tune with the political course of internal revolution, the United States has used foreign aid largely as an auxiliary of military policy.

Few leaders in Washington would deny that since military power has ceased to be the means of settling differences with the Soviet bloc intelligent and imaginative foreign economic policies have become increasingly essential. Yet how can these be created until American policy-makers agree with Asian leaders as to the nature of the forces that threaten the stability of the Far East? For any American program that underestimates the power of Asian nationalism denies the strength of those indigenous forces that brought the new nations into being and perpetuates the gap between challenge and response in this nation's relations with the Orient. If the issues raised by foreign aid are powerful and clear, it seems doubtful that they will be debated with sufficient vigor and candor to enlighten the nation or alter the course of American foreign policy.

"The Democratic attempt to make the farm issue a deciding factor in the 1956 elections was definitely weakened by steadily rising farm prices in the first seven months of the year," notes this specialist, who believes that "With Eisenhower as the Republican candidate, it seems reasonably certain that most mid-western farmers will not desert the party with which they have such strong ties of tradition."

The Farm Issue

BY GILBERT FITE

Chairman, Department of History, University of Oklahoma

AS FARM PRICES and income skidded sharply in the fall and early winter of 1955, it was widely proclaimed that the farm question would be a vital issue in the approaching presidential campaign. Democrats, and even some midwest Republicans, bitterly attacked Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson and charged that Republican farm policies were grinding farmers between the millstones of low agricultural prices and high costs of production. By December, 1955, hogs had dropped to little more than ten cents a pound in most Corn Belt markets.

Was not this proof, said Democratic spokesmen, that the Republican party had no concern for farm welfare? Thus as the parties squared off for the 1956 presidential race, it appeared that national agricultural policy would loom large as a campaign issue.

One of the most persistent political issues before the American people since 1920 has been federal aid to agriculture. This situation developed because of the relatively unfavorable economic position of farmers, es-

pecially those who produced staple crops like wheat and cotton. Farmers did not participate fully in the prosperity of the 1920's, and they suffered terrible losses in the Depression Decade. It was not until World War II that there was a genuine restoration of farm prosperity. This was due to the tremendous wartime demands for food and fiber, as well as to the fact that non-farm commodities which farmers had to buy were under price controls. Thus in October, 1946, farm ratio prices reached their high point of 123 per cent of parity. However, by May, 1956, nearly ten years later, farm prices stood at about 85 per cent of parity.

Many factors were responsible for the ups and downs of farm prices and income, but the fact remained that when prices were less favorable to farmers they were likely to seek a political remedy by voting against the party in power. In most of the presidential elections since 1920 the farm issue has been important, although not often the deciding factor.

In 1924, hundreds and thousands of normally Republican farmers in the Upper Midwest voted for Robert M. LaFollette as a protest against President Coolidge's hostility toward federal aid to agriculture. Four years later a much stronger effort was made to wean Republican farmers away from the party of Lincoln. Since Coolidge, with the blessing of Herbert Hoover, had killed the McNary-Haugen bills, Democrats sought to rally farm support around their presidential candidate, Alfred E. Smith.

However, the Democrats were unable to

Gilbert C. Fite is Chairman of the Department of History at the University of Oklahoma. He has written many articles on the history of agriculture and farm policy. His most recent books are *George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity* and *The Agricultural Regions of the United States*, written with Ladd Haystead.

sell conservative, dry, Protestant farmers on Smith, who was a Catholic and a wet, and who, besides, knew very little about farm problems. Nonetheless, Republican majorities in several midwestern farm states were sharply reduced. This indicated a strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction with Republican farm policies, or lack of them.

By the time of the presidential election in 1932 there was an acute agricultural crisis which had left farmers in an ugly mood. In his campaign for the presidency, Franklin D. Roosevelt promised farmers positive federal aid which would be much broader in scope than Hoover's Agricultural Marketing Act. Believing that the Republicans would or could not provide effective relief, farmers in the traditionally Republican midwestern states deserted Hoover in droves. Promises made by Democrats to reduce surpluses and to raise farm prices were accepted by farmers at their face value. All of the principal farming regions voted overwhelmingly for Roosevelt.

In 1936 the Republicans sought to recapture their vote losses by vigorously attacking Democratic farm policies. After three years of the AAA, said Republican spokesmen, farm income was still below the levels of the 1920's. It was also charged that farmers were being regimented and were losing their freedom. Importation of competing farm crops under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements was also denounced. However, pleas by Republican orators urging farmers to return to the fold fell on deaf ears as Democrats reminded them of two-cent hogs and twenty-cent wheat under Hoover. Nineteen thirty-six was an even more disastrous year for the Republican party in Farm Belt states.

By the fall of 1940, prices had recovered under the impact of war and increased government expenditures. Many farmers who had voted for Roosevelt twice now went back to the Republican party. Although midwestern farmers were ready to vote Democratic in times of crisis, they had strong traditional ties with the Republican party, ties which asserted themselves in periods of better prices. Wendell Willkie carried the farm states of Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas, Colorado, Iowa and Illinois and

Michigan where the farm vote was important but less decisive. The agricultural issue was not a major question in the presidential election of 1944, but Republicans scarcely held their gains of four years earlier.

It was the sweeping Congressional victories in 1946 which caused days of jubilee in the Republican camp. At last, not only farmers but others who had backed the Roosevelt New Deal seemed in the mood to vote Republican. However, Harry S. Truman shattered this idea in 1948.

In a give 'em hell campaign, Truman made the farm question a major issue. He accused the Republican-dominated Eightieth Congress of failing to look after farm interests. He pointed to a lack of storage facilities for farm crops, and accused the Republicans of being hostile to soil conservation expenditures and rural electrification. Truman was so effective that he convinced many farmers that a vote for Thomas E. Dewey would mean a return to the dark days of Hoover. To the surprise of about everyone except Truman, he carried such key farm states as Iowa, Minnesota, and Illinois.

Although the farm economy slumped in 1948 and 1949, agricultural prosperity was greatly stimulated by the Korean War which broke out in 1950. Prices of some commodities had dropped slightly by the fall of 1952, but the agricultural question was not a major consideration in the presidential campaign which saw the Republicans return to power with widespread farm support. It was not until after the Eisenhower administration had taken office that a bitter controversy arose over national farm policy.

Parity Prices

During the campaign of 1952, Eisenhower had promised farmers that his administration would work toward the goal of 100 per cent of parity prices for basic farm products. Parity prices had become a symbol of justice and equity to most of the nation's farmers, and many of them had concluded that it was the federal government's responsibility to guarantee such prices. However, as surpluses accumulated and prices weakened, there was a growing belief among some agricultural and government leaders, as well

as many farmers, that rigid price supports at 90 or 100 per cent of parity were chiefly responsible for the situation.

Eisenhower's Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, was one of those who opposed rigid price supports for farm commodities. He insisted that price-depressing surpluses could not be removed unless Congress abandoned the policy of supporting basic commodities at 90 per cent of parity. Secretary Benson recommended a sliding or flexible scale of price supports, somewhere between 75 and 90 per cent of parity, depending on the supply.

If farmers cut their production and reduced surpluses, price supports would be higher. If they continued to produce unmanageable surpluses, price supports would be lowered toward the 75 per cent of parity figure.

The theory behind this idea was that if price supports were lower farmers would produce less than under a system of high and rigid supports. The Benson-Eisenhower scheme seemed plausible on its face, but it flew in the face of the historical facts of farm production. For example, in 1931 and 1932, farmers planted very heavy crop acreages, despite low prices. Five-cent cotton and twenty-five-cent wheat had not deterred production. In fact, low prices may well have the opposite effect and stimulate farmers to produce more pounds or bushels in order to get enough income to meet their minimum needs.

In any event, the Republican Congress passed a flexible price support law in 1954. The passage of the Benson-Eisenhower program, which had the strong backing of the American Farm Bureau Federation, coincided with a steady decline in the price of many farm commodities. Net agricultural income fell from \$16,955,000,000 in 1952 to \$14,296,000,000 in 1954, and it continued further downward in 1955. The average price of corn was \$1.37 per bushel on November 15, 1954, but it had declined to \$1.09 a year later. In December of 1954, hogs brought around \$17.00 a hundred pounds, but twelve months later they had dropped to between \$10.00 and \$11.00 in most hog markets. Cattle prices were also down. By December 1, 1955, farm prices were about

28 per cent below what they had been in 1951.

By the fall of 1955, the criticisms of Secretary Benson and his policies had reached hurricane proportions. The further farm prices fell, the louder these complaints became. Democrats, and a number of Midwestern Republican congressmen, laid the blame for declining farm prosperity on Benson and the flexible support program.

By late October, 1955, Secretary Benson was under such heavy fire that President Eisenhower felt obliged to come publicly to his defense. On October 29, the President announced that he had full confidence in Benson and had no thought of dismissing him. At about the same time, the Secretary announced a six-point farm program which the Administration planned to inaugurate. This included expansion of farm exports, a broader conservation program with incentive payments, and something for low income farm families. Benson promised "no nostrum. No one-shot remedy, no cure-all." But, he said, "It will be constructive."

When the Democrats scoffed at the Benson proposals and kept insisting on a return to 90 per cent of parity, the Secretary charged that Democrats were picking agriculture "as the major domestic battlefield for 1956." He was undoubtedly right, and, at the time, it appeared as though the Democrats had selected a favorable field of battle.

During the last weeks of 1955 and early 1956, it looked like a grass roots farm revolt might be developing. Politicians shunned farmers who had recently sold a load of ten or eleven cent hogs. No congressman or senator wanted to explain this situation to irate farmers. However, the Republicans were active in trying to put together a program which would allay the discontent and they managed to match the Democrats promise for promise.

Soil Bank Plan

During the scramble for political advantage on the farm question, President Eisenhower had remained aloof. However, in his State of the Union Message on January 5, Eisenhower announced that he planned to launch a more vigorous and com-

prehensive attack on the "deep-seated problems" of agriculture. He urged Congress to place farm welfare "above and beyond politics." Four days later, on January 9, the President presented his nine-point program to Congress. The most important part of Eisenhower's plan was the soil bank or acreage reserve program. This scheme called for cash payments to farmers in return for taking land in basic crops out of production.

The farm question was now clearly up to Congress. As the nation's lawmakers settled down to hammer out a new farm bill both Republicans and Democrats jockeyed for political position. Democratic leaders insisted that Secretary Benson's flexible price support policy must be abandoned and that the prices of basic farm commodities be re-established at 90 per cent of parity. Both parties agreed that the soil bank plan would be helpful to farmers.

Time was of the essence. Farmers needed to know just what government policies were going to be adopted in order to adjust their individual farm programs accordingly. After considerable delay, Congress passed the farm bill on April 11. It included provisions for the President's soil bank, but also contained rigid price supports for basic commodities at 90 per cent of parity. A fairly large number of Midwestern Republicans joined the Democrats to push through the parity section of the new bill.

The Eisenhower supporters correctly predicted that the President would veto the measure. Actually, he had no other choice if he wanted to remain true to his public statements opposing high, fixed price supports. The bill, too, was inconsistent with the entire program of his Secretary of Agriculture. It was not a matter of farm relief versus no farm relief. The President was fully committed to the principle that the federal government had a basic responsibility to help maintain farm income.

The heart of the controversy was whether farmers were to be subsidized along the lines desired by the President, or by programs authored by a Democratically controlled Congress. A few days later Eisenhower vetoed the bill largely on the basis that it included a return to 90 per cent of parity for basic products. At the same time he urged

Congress to pass his soil bank plan without what he considered encumbering and undesirable provisions.

The Democrats lost no time in criticizing the President's veto. They insisted that the Eisenhower action was only another step in his long record of broken pledges to farmers. But despite the abundance of oratory, the Democrats found themselves in a difficult political position on the farm question. Obviously, presidential opposition was going to prevent the passage of any bill containing high, inflexible price supports. If the Democrats continued to insist on this policy it would likely result in no legislation at all, and in that case the Republicans could blame the Democratically controlled Congress for blocking special farm aid.

Democratic leaders did not cherish the thought of being placed in that position. Consequently, they announced on April 26 that they would not continue their fight for 90 per cent of parity. At the same time, Democratic leaders promised to support the President's soil bank plan.

On May 28, Eisenhower signed a revised farm bill which provided \$1,200,000,000 for farmers who withdrew basic crops from production and put land in the so-called soil bank. The President had asked for permission to pay farmers up to \$500,000,000 in 1956 for taking land out of production in 1957. However, Democrats had defeated this pre-payment provision, calling it a "political lollipop" and a scheme "to buy the farm vote." Nonetheless, this seemed like a smart political move by the Eisenhower administration.

Throughout the political skirmishes early in 1956, and the obvious bid for farm votes by both parties, the Republicans seemed to come out with only a few scratches. The speed with which Republicans moved to get some money to farmers before election seemed to be favorably received by many farmers. After vetoing the first farm bill in April, President Eisenhower had raised the parity price of several farm commodities by administrative action. Moreover, as soon as the second bill had become law, the Department of Agriculture acted quickly to put the soil bank in operation. *Capper's Farmer* estimated in its August issue that farmers

would be receiving checks *before* election. It was said that 50,000 farmers in Iowa alone might get soil bank payments in 1956.

Secretary Benson first declared that the soil bank was not to be used for flood and drought relief. However, he soon reversed himself and the Department permitted farmers to put land in the soil bank if the crop had been destroyed by drought or flood. This might not have much effect in reducing surpluses, the stated objective of the law, but it was a windfall to farmers who otherwise would have received little or nothing from dried out or flooded fields.

No Republican tears were shed when Benson told farmers they could qualify for payments "by plowing under crops now growing." There could be no doubt but that by July the Republicans were wringing every drop of political advantage possible out of the soil bank legislation.

It appears that the Republicans have outmaneuvered the Democrats on the farm issue in 1956. The red hot discontent which seemed so prevalent in the last months of 1955 and the early weeks of 1956 has apparently cooled. The Democrats were not able to capitalize on farm unrest to the degree they had hoped. In fact, they even failed to identify themselves with the soil bank idea which was really an old Democratic policy dating back to the days when Henry A. Wallace was Secretary of Agriculture. Moreover, the Democrats have been handicapped because they have had nothing new or imaginative to offer the farmers. The 90 per cent of parity issue appears to have lost some of its political appeal.

The Democratic attempt to make the farm issue a deciding factor in the 1956 elections was definitely weakened by steadily rising farm prices in the first seven months of the year. Corn, which had fallen to \$1.09 in December, 1955, had risen to \$1.39 six months later. Hog prices had gradually worked back up to about \$16.00 a hundred by July, an increase of some \$5.00 or \$6.00 a hundred pounds in seven months. Lamb prices in the spring and summer of 1956 were about as good as the 1947-1949 average. By May, about the time the farm bill was passed, cotton was bringing 90 per cent

of parity; wheat, 83 per cent; rice, 81 per cent; corn, 79 per cent; milk, 91 per cent; and lambs, 91 per cent.

The Democratic drive for farm votes not only has been stymied by the soil bank and by higher agricultural prices, but by the continued personal popularity of President Eisenhower. One of the surprising things about the farm issue as it developed in late 1955 and early 1956 was the degree to which the President succeeded in remaining apart from the main stream of criticism. Secretary Benson suffered most of the attacks, although it might seem that Eisenhower rather than his appointee should have been held responsible for unpopular farm policies.

This does not mean that Eisenhower has avoided criticism entirely, but the Democrats have failed in identifying him in the public mind as an enemy of the farmer.

There are other factors which seem to discount any genuine anti-Republican revolt among farmers in 1956. Despite all of the tears which have been shed over the plight of agriculture, not all farmers are suffering from the cost-price squeeze. Younger farmers who have accumulated heavy debts are obviously worse off than those who had their land and machinery paid for before prices started downward in 1952.

Moreover, there are so many different types and sizes of farms, so many different crops produced in the United States, that it is hard to get farmers to agree on political and economic policies except in a period of widespread distress. This condition does not exist today.

With Eisenhower as the Republican candidate, it seems reasonably certain that most midwestern farmers will not desert the party with which they have such strong ties of tradition. This is not to say that there is no discontent in the midwest farm states. There is unrest. Actually the Democrats may win additional seats in the House and Senate on the farm issue, but Eisenhower will probably carry most of the Republican farm vote. Unless the situation greatly changes just before the election, it does not seem likely that there will be any farm revolt in the presidential election of 1956.

"Certainly union leaders can dream of an administration where once again they will be consulted on important matters, where their ranks will be combed for key personnel and where the White House will have people they can talk to if the going gets rough across the bargaining table." Still, as the author notes: "The overriding reason why there are no outstanding issues is, of course, the existence of prosperity" which "does rob labor of outstanding political issues."

Labor and the 1956 Election

BY MONROE BERKOWITZ

Associate Professor of Economics, Rutgers University

THE PECULIAR thing about the "labor" vote is that no one is quite sure what it is or even whether it exists. Labor union leaders, immersed in daily political maneuvering, conscious of the political consequences of their every move, stoutly maintain with the President of the Auto Workers Union, "I have only one vote. I control no one else's vote. I never claimed that I have."¹

If by labor is meant the whole labor force, the answer must be that obviously there is no such thing as a bloc vote of the entire labor force. There are about as many people in the labor force as voted in the 1952 elections; there are more persons in the non-supervisory categories than voted for either candidate in 1952. When most people talk of the labor vote they refer to the votes of the unionized portion of the labor force, and union members, of course, constitute a numerical minority of the labor force or of labor by any of the alternatively accepted definitions.

Even, however, if the discussion is confined to the approximately 17 million union members, it is doubtful if these votes are in

anybody's pockets. Walter Reuther speaks with false modesty when he claims that he doesn't control anyone else's vote, but he is astute enough to recognize that the more than 1.5 million members of his own auto workers' union are divided in their political allegiances. The myth of a bloc of labor votes was never firmly established in our folklore but it received a rude setback in 1940 when the leader of the United Mine Workers could not persuade his members that Wendell Willkie was to be preferred over Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

No one knows for a certainty to what extent the union vote can be delivered. The few case studies that have been made stress the apathy of the individual union member towards political questions outside the realm of his narrow interests.² Available research findings indicate, however, that the question is really an incomplete one. It is not whether the labor union vote can be delivered but whether it can be delivered for or against particular issues or candidates. Certainly the American worker prizes the franchise too highly to give a blank check to any man who happens to be his collective bargaining representative. Labor union leaders, however, may be able to influence the vote of workers, at least in the direction in which it is already inclined.

Although labor leaders may not be able

Monroe Berkowitz lectures in the Institute of Management and Labor Relations' various programs. He is a member of several national and state panels of arbitrators and serves from time to time as arbitrator in labor disputes. He is the co-author of Economics—Experience and Analysis.

¹ Speech by Walter P. Reuther before 9th Annual Convention of Americans for Democratic Action, Saturday, May 12, 1956, Hotel Shoreham, Washington, D. C.

² See Ruth Alice Hudson and Hjalmer Rosen, "Union Political Action: The Member Speaks," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. VII, No. 3, April 1954, and Joel Seidman, Jack London and Bernard Karsh, "Political Consciousness in a Local Union," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. XV, No. 4, Winter, 1951-1952.

to deliver bloc votes of their members, they can use facilities at their command to mobilize voters in support of candidates and issues which have a built-in appeal to the working class. This kind of support ought not to be underestimated. After all, the A.F.L.-C.I.O. unions employ perhaps 60 thousand full-time staff people. More than half of these employees are politically conscious and highly articulate persons whose daily life is spent in contacting workers and in persuading them to one course of action or other. These staff people, if properly mobilized, constitute the core of an effective political machine. Here are people who can be called upon for leg work, door-bell ringing, and precinct organization.

This year the A.F.L.-C.I.O. has started on its political organization work early in the game. The Political Action Committee of the C.I.O. and the Labor's League for Political Education of the A.F.L. have been merged into one organization called the Committee on Political Education (COPE). Essentially, COPE is continuing the activities of its separate predecessor organizations.

It is preparing congressional voting guides, manuals on how to get out the vote, it is holding schools, and doing the best it can to raise funds. The primary drive is to get people registered; the secondary problem is to get people to vote for candidates who have been endorsed by the labor organizations once they are registered.

Candidates who have doubts about the ability of labor leaders to deliver votes may still seek labor endorsement for financial reasons. The modest political contributions made to COPE may not match the contributions made by the families of the people the union leaders meet on the other side of the bargaining table, but in a political campaign every bit helps. In 1952, labor union groups reported to the federal government spending a little more than \$2 million. COPE expects to raise at least that much this year.

A drive is being put on to get the usual \$1 contribution from each of the 15 million members in the A.F.L.-C.I.O., but COPE will probably do well if it gets much over \$1 million. Possibly another million dollars

will be reported by individual A.F.L.-C.I.O. unions and by other unions not affiliated with the federation. Most of this money will be spent for direct contributions to candidates to be used as the candidates desire.

In addition to actual contributions, unions will be able to aid particular candidates and issues by "political education." The courts have held that a union may devote an issue of its newspaper to extolling the virtues of a candidate and then distribute this widely without violating the bans on political contributions of the Taft-Hartley Act.

Unions can also make television and radio time available to candidates and can offer them widely publicized forums at union conventions. Money spent in holding schools on political activity, or in getting workers registered, or other "educational" activities would not be reported to the federal government as political contributions.

What Do Unions Want From Politics?

If it is possible for the politician to get something tangible from a labor endorsement, the question remains what can unions get from the politician? It is difficult to generalize about a labor movement as diverse as the American. The interests of local building trade groups are different from the mass production steel union which operates in a nationwide market. The Republican leaders in the Carpenters' union want something different than the Left-wing Democrats in the United Auto Workers. The Teamsters may simply want to be left alone, free to pursue their aggressive organizing tactics, while the socially-minded Garment Workers may want an interventionist government concerned with civil rights and ethical practices.

Recognizing the dangers involved in generalizing, still it might be said that on the national scale unions want a "friendly" administration in Washington. A friendly administration is one that understands something of the crisis nature of collective bargaining and provides a Washington platform for the dramatization of the issues. A

Roosevelt or a Truman could be counted upon to invite deadlocked participants in a collective bargaining dispute to the White House and to apply judicious pressures.

Even if a settlement was not forthcoming, the press would publish pictures of the parties on the White House lawn and the rank and file were assured that their elected leaders had carried the fight to the top. Today, the names of union leaders are not conspicuous on the White House calling list. Small wonder that the leader of the Steelworkers Union, David McDonald, when asked whether Washington was going to intervene before the start of the recent steel strike, remarked sardonically, "Do we still have a government in Washington?"

The Eisenhower administration can proclaim loud and long that the Republicans have done much for the laboring man. Officials can point to the increase in minimum wage rates, to liberalized social security payments, to the prosperity which has provided jobs, and so forth. Sometimes, however, as far as labor is concerned, it is as important how a thing is done as what is done.

Few of the so-called labor accomplishments of the Eisenhower administration were planned with the aid and advice of the union folk. The one union man incongruously placed in the Cabinet soon found the atmosphere repressing. The present Secretary of Labor is well-liked among union officialdom but the leaders regard him more as an ambassador of a foreign power accredited to a neutral nation than as one of them.

Certainly union leaders can dream of an administration where once again they will be consulted on important matters, where their ranks will be combed for key personnel, and where the White House will have people they can talk to if the going gets rough across the bargaining table.

Given the present conservative coalition of the Republicans, this can mean only that the labor union leaders must stay more or less within the Democratic fold. As Samuel Lubell and others have pointed out, the core of the problem is that, given the prevailing Republican drift, labor's only practical alternative is to ride with the Demo-

cratic party. To sit out the election would only be to confess defeat in advance. In addition, it is highly questionable whether labor union leaders could influence the laboring masses away from the Democratic party to which they are bound by ties which are religious and ethnic as well as economic.

There is no serious thought being given to A.F.L.-C.I.O. endorsement of the Republican candidate. The question was, however, whether or not organized labor would endorse the Democratic nominee and how influential they would be in picking him. The most that the Teamsters' Dave Beck or the Carpenters' Maurice Hutcheson can hope for is that they can swing enough votes to have the A.F.L.-C.I.O. stay formally out of the presidential battle and concentrate instead on state and local issues.

But they may face a losing fight. Most top union leaders were anxious to influence the Democratic party in its platform and choice of a candidate. The one thing that might prevent A.F.L.-C.I.O. endorsement of the Democratic candidate is the civil rights issue. Reuther has said that the Democratic party will have to choose between Senator Eastland and Walter Reuther. If the Democratic candidate does smack too much of Southern control, it may very well be that this issue will force the union leaders to remain formally neutral.

On the state and local levels, labor will endorse and support particular candidates and make special efforts to defeat others. Endorsements in some cases will be a mere formality and in other cases COPE will concentrate money and efforts in the closely contested races. Certainly unions will support strongly Senator Wayne Morse's fight for re-election in Oregon, especially in light of the concerted Republican effort that is being made to defeat him.

If Senator Lehman of New York chose to make the race again, he undoubtedly would have had strong backing. Other senators, such as Hennings of Missouri, Clements of Kentucky, and Magnuson of Washington will probably be in for a share of COPE money and manpower. On the other side, efforts will be made to defeat certain of the incumbent Republican senators, such as

Bush of Connecticut, Dirksen of Illinois, and Hickenlooper of Iowa. In the House races COPE will be working in the so-called marginal areas where incumbents were elected with less than a five per cent margin in 1954.

Although a good deal of enthusiasm might be worked up for a particular Democratic candidate, the latent divisive forces in the labor movement tend to assert themselves in the state races. In New Jersey, for example, there is a split between the aggressive Democratic-minded C.I.O. people and the Republican-minded A.F.L. Although these groups may formally merge into one organization, political leanings and affiliations are not easily erased by formal amalgamation. In other states there may be A.F.L. support for some incumbent GOP senators, such as Bender of Ohio and Butler in Maryland, and the A.F.L. people may try to prevent the federation from making any formal endorsements in these races.

Are There Any Issues?

Whether particular candidates should or should not be endorsed are decisions that will be made within labor's official circles, but in the final analysis, who is endorsed is probably less important than whether or not the unions can really muster the vote, even in the direction in which it is already inclined. Issues are required to get out the vote. People must be aroused to go out and vote for or against a person or an issue.

Labor is, of course, a power group in the economy and asserts its legitimate right to speak out on *all* political questions. A glance at any issue of the *A.F.L.-C.I.O. News* will indicate a wide range of issues on which the federation comments or thinks important enough to include in the official newspaper. The issue of June 16 has articles on the Supreme Court decision on Eisenhower's executive order allowing summary suspension and dismissal of government employees under security procedures, the \$3 billion slash in individual income tax which the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Committee on Economic Policy is asking, the activities of the French government in Algeria, the report of the Ford Foundation on civil liberties and race rela-

tions, the extension of the GI loans, and the trimming of foreign aid programs.

The same issue of June 16 presents a box-score on Congress and here congressional voting activity is examined, not only on social security and labor legislation but also on housing, area redevelopment, the question of the Niagara River and Hell's Canyon power developments, atomic energy, trade cooperation, highways and foreign aid. In short, there is no issue that comes before the American public that is not a matter of concern to a group such as the A.F.L.-C.I.O.

There is, of course, no reason why this group, which does represent a significant segment of the American people, should *not* be concerned with all matters. However, the question is whether or not there are any issues which will tantalize workers sufficiently to vote or to persuade their fellow workers to come out and vote for a particular issue or for a particular candidate. The truth seems to be that most of these issues are either too big to arouse workers' interests or too small to be of immediate concern.

The overriding reason why there are no outstanding issues is, of course, the existence of prosperity. As Daniel Bell has pointed out, prosperity does not solve all or dissolve all social problems; * nonetheless, it does rob labor of outstanding political issues. With a gross national product pushing the \$400 billion mark, incomes of workers are at all-time highs. This has enabled many of the workers to move to suburbs where, perhaps, they have taken on some of the middle-class coloration of their surroundings.

Peace and prosperity combined with the magnetic appeal of an attractive personality may allow the Republicans to make heavy inroads into the normally Democratic union vote. Republican strategy, of course, is banking heavily on this and it may be that Republican faith in peace and prosperity as effective vote-getters will not be mistaken. Paradoxically enough, the one thing that might strengthen unions at the polls—the spreading of the unemployment virus now localized in Detroit and a few other industrial centers—would, of course, be disastrous

* "Interpretations of American Politics," *The New American Right*, Daniel Bell, Editor, N. Y., Criterion Books, 1955.

for their economic strength and well-being.

The A.F.L. has always been in politics. Sam Gompers' slogan of "Reward your friends; punish your enemies" was designed to limit labor's participation in political activities and, perhaps more importantly, to limit independent political action in the third party fashion. Nonetheless it is indicative of the fact that the unions were concerned with particular campaigns. The C.I.O. has been in politics ever since it was founded. But serious organization for getting out the vote and other multiple political activities of labor on the national level was not accomplished before 1947. In a sense, then, labor is relatively new at this sort of thing and still has much to learn.

With Experience Comes Wisdom

A tour of a group of local union offices at the close of the 1952 election campaign showed that there were large amounts of literature from the political arms of the A.F.L. or the C.I.O. stacked on the floor and shelves. The literature was mailed to the local union officers where it remained, undistributed to union members. In some locals distribution was attempted at union membership meetings, which are notorious for having a small percentage of members present.

This year COPE intends to adopt a mailing procedure which is expensive but probably effective. When pamphlets on the voting records of individual congressmen are completed, they will be mailed directly to the unionist's home rather than distributed on the job or at union meetings. Aside from accomplishing the task of distribution, one great dividend will be that the literature may fall into the hands of workers' wives, a group who are suspected of defecting from the labor-endorsed candidates in 1952.

Woman suffrage brought peculiar problems to the labor movement. Wives without industrial experience tend, at times, to be suspicious of labor activities and to resent the fact that their husbands spend time attending meetings and participating in other activities of the labor union. In part this is due to a lack of understanding and COPE

intends to set up special schools and training conferences for women.

In addition, the A.F.L.-C.I.O. is setting up machinery for merging the women's auxiliaries of the C.I.O. and the A.F.L. and presumably will attempt to revitalize these organizations. COPE is certainly not anxious to see its activities in getting out the vote of union members neutralized by having wives vote in opposite fashion.

COPE is learning that labor's political activity must be carried on skillfully and with finesse. Union members can become distrustful of officials who become too politically aggressive. The spectre of Taft's Ohio majority in 1950 of 430,000 votes is an indication of the fact that an overly militant campaign can provoke fear and opposition among union workers.

Lubell⁴ analyzed the Taft campaign for the Senate in 1950 and found that many workers voted for Taft because of the strong union campaign for his opponent. He tells the story of an employee who was laid off from a Youngstown dairy. When a delegation of fellow-workers asked the union for help in reinstating the man they were told that they should forget it because the first job of the union was to beat Bob Taft. It was at that point, Lubell says, that the dairy workers decided to vote for Taft.

The Ohio disaster of 1950 will probably not be repeated. After all, the union people on COPE are people who have been trained in political activity. Labor unions are political institutions, and the labor union leader, above all, must be a consummate politician in dealing with his own members. Union leaders are learning that modern social science research techniques are useful in determining attitudes of the worker towards collective bargaining and political matters and they are becoming more skilled in the "engineering of consent." Also, increasing recognition is being given to the fact that keeping track of voter activity is a complicated job and consequently the IBM machines are being rented to tabulate the precinct activity of labor union members.

Unions are beginning to recognize that political activity is a year-round job; not

⁴ Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, N. Y., Harper & Bros., 1951.

just a question of electing particular representatives, senators or a president. It is a question of constantly lobbying for new laws and policing existing legislation, of becoming acquainted with the bureaucrats who administer the regulations, and of seeking favorable decisions on particular issues as they come up.

It is no accident that in the last three years five unions have moved to the capital. At present, headquarters of 45 national unions are housed in Washington, including the national headquarters of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., now in its new \$4 million building. If the year-round political influence is to be maintained, labor must muster whatever political strength it can in the elections.

All this may mean that in 1956 labor may be all dressed up for political activity with no place in particular to go, but these are

the fortunes of the political wars. Win, lose or draw, the unions and their leaders will not be the least of the people who will be educated by the 1956 elections; their organizations will come out with new techniques and with new insights into the difficult problem of mustering political activity.

Whether all this is good or bad for the country is yet another matter. If, however, we remain confident of the fact that the individual worker's vote is his to dispose of as he wishes and recognize that all of the multiple activities of the labor unions are designed merely to influence him (and are one of many influences), it cannot be said that this is a wholly bad thing. Labor is taking its place as one of the many interest groups in a democracy whose virtue seems to be its ability to reconcile various conflicting interests.

• • • •

"Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as in the latter state even the stronger individuals are prompted by the uncertainty of their condition to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the confederacy, and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter; or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain that it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the *republican cause*, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle."

James Madison in THE FEDERALIST, No. 51

"One of the great significances of the issue of segregation in politics is the encouragement of the demagogue," writes this objective reporter, who notes that "the elections this year have opened the eyes of Southern moderates to the power of the segregation issue and the ugly possibilities of its exploration in a time of tension."

Segregation In Politics

BY BERT COLLIER

Reporter on the Miami Herald

SEGREGATION is an issue in American life today, exactly in proportion to the number, concentration, economic status and educational attainments of Negro citizens.

It is no problem at all in a small mid-western town where the handful of Negro families is a familiar and accepted part of the community. But it is a blazing topic in Macon County, Alabama, where Negroes make up 85 per cent of the citizenry and, but for artificially maintained restrictions, would take over every county and municipal office. It is a sore question in New York, Chicago, Detroit and other industrial cities where the growing Negro groups demand substance for their ancient dream of equal opportunity.

It is an issue in the national election. Not an open one, for both parties are firmly on record for equal and full citizenship for all, regardless of race. But on the precinct level, particularly in the South, the issue of segregation may be decisive.

Certainly segregation has been a hot issue in Southern state and local primaries. In some instances, those who doubted the importance of shouting support for the traditions of racial separation have gone down to surprising defeat.

Bert Collier has recently concluded a tour of the South for a series on the desegregation problem. He is the Florida correspondent for Newsweek magazine and for the Southern Education Reporting Service which is documenting the progress of integration. For many years Mr. Collier wrote on political and economic topics for the Atlanta Georgian, now defunct.

The result is a serious retrogression in Southern politics which has been emerging from the school of "waving the bloody shirt," that is, refighting the Civil War and lambasting the Yankees, a sure-fire road to election.

Candidates who talked of "keeping the Negro in his place" have done surprisingly well, winning in some cases, in others frightening established leaders into abandoning their "moderate" positions and joining the die-hard camps.

Alabama is a case in point. Governor James E. Folsom, the big, bluff chief executive, offered for Democratic National Committeeman. Alabama's race-conscious leaders decided that "Big Jim," who won his first term as Governor with the aid of the C.I.O., was too soft on the race issue.

Folsom's stand was that racial problems must be settled within the framework of the law and that the Supreme Court mandate for mixed schools was the law of the land—a position not a few Southern officeholders held and abandoned.

When young State Representative Charles W. McKay, Jr., pushed an interposition resolution through the Alabama legislature, Folsom tagged it "hogwash" and vetoed it.

This angered the white supremacy forces. McKay set out to defeat Folsom for the sensitive party post. He beat him decisively. Every candidate for party office attached to Folsom also went down with him.

There was no essential point of difference between the candidates except segregation, and that only in degree.

The way in which segregation can become an issue, even when the candidates staunchly oppose it, was illustrated in the Florida presidential preferential primary.

The records of both Adlai Stevenson and

Senator Estes Kefauver are clear on racial discrimination. They are in many respects identical. But one of Stevenson's principal supporters was former Governor Millard E. Caldwell, one-time director of the Civil Defense Administration.

In introducing Stevenson to a rally in Tallahassee, Caldwell pointedly referred to Kefauver as an out-and-out advocate of race mixing. Kefauver retorted that Stevenson was an ambivalent candidate, failing to repudiate this racist support in Florida, while using Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt as one of his principal campaigners in California on precisely the opposite tack.

Undoubtedly this type of campaigning hurt Kefauver. Liberalism is even more a sin in the eyes of many Southerners when the advocate is a Southerner.

The injection of the spurious issue, insofar as this particular campaign was concerned, may have cost Kefauver Florida's votes in a close contest. As it was, Stevenson's victory was indecisive.

FLORIDA

Politics, as a matter of fact, has changed Florida's official attitude toward segregation.

When the first Supreme Court decision was announced, Florida adopted a policy of resigned acceptance. Attorney General Richard W. Ervin called it a "bitter pill." United States Senator Spessard L. Holland said it was repugnant to his views and to those of the majority of white Floridians.

Nevertheless, both cautioned that the court decision was law. Holland advised his constituents to "learn to live with it."

Ervin intervened before the Supreme Court and filed an historic brief in which he advanced the theory of "gradualism." He asked for a period of preparation, and wide latitude for local courts which could take into consideration the climate of community opinion in gauging the pace of compliance.

This view the court adopted in its order to local school boards to proceed with "all deliberate speed."

But Florida, formerly praised by the N.A.A.C.P. as a model in working out the problems of mixed schools, is now firming among the resisting states. The decisive

factor was a political campaign in which segregation was whipped up by one candidate as the sole issue.

All other candidates for governor felt compelled to speak out also against integration.

The outcome was a graphic demonstration of why segregation is an attractive issue for politicians. General Sumter Lowry, the White Supremacy spokesman, a political unknown without experience or campaigning ability, piled up a huge vote. He took second place, ahead of such seasoned veterans as former Governor Fuller Warren and former House Speaker Faris Bryant.

Governor LeRoy Collins won, but the state's gradualist policies are now replaced by all-out resistance by "all lawful means."

NORTH CAROLINA

North Carolina, another state regarded as outside the orbit of the die-hard plantation South, felt the effects of the racial issue on politics. Three members of its Congressional delegation who refused to sign the manifesto against the Supreme Court decision faced hot contests. Two failed to win renomination.

One was Charles B. Deane, a veteran of five terms, a church leader and an outstanding worker in liberal causes. His opposition developed after the manifesto issue arose. He was unseated in a hard fight in which the racial issue was prominent.

In the case of Representative Thurmond Chatham, a retired manufacturer serving his fourth term, his refusal to sign the manifesto was mentioned, but this was not the key issue. He was beaten by Paul J. Scott.

The victory of Harold D. Cooley, a Congressional veteran of 22 years and chairman of the House Agricultural Committee, seems more significant. Worried by the progress of his opponent, a speaker who made important capital of Coe's refusal to sign the manifesto, the congressman went to the hustings and advocated continued segregation.

Carolinians said he, in effect, "signed" the manifesto in his campaign speeches. He won handily.

ARKANSAS

In Arkansas, political pressures also caused a reversal of policy.

When the Supreme Court decision was announced, Governor Orval E. Faubus took a "moderate" view. In his first official statement two years ago, he said:

"The problem of desegregation should be solved at the local level."

One year later he spoke of the "serious local problems" raised by segregation which were almost impossible of solution.

In 1956, with a political campaign looming, Faubus completed the turnaround. He plumped for "legal steps" to circumvent the decision, asked for the adoption of a resolution of interposition, and said that if he had been in Congress he would have signed the manifesto.

GEORGIA

The most important political triumph of the racists was the retirement of Georgia's Senator Walter F. George in the face of almost certain defeat by young Herman Talmadge, former governor and son of the late Eugene Talmadge of the "red galluses."

George's leadership has been on the conservative side and he was one of the most respected figures in the Senate. His friends realized, however, that he would be heavily beset by Talmadge on the race issue. The 77-year-old George decided to retire rather than face the type of political sniping that would ensue.

It seems certain that Talmadge will take his seat in the Senate in January. His will be the loudest voice for the cause of the segregationists. He easily outclasses Mississippi's Senator James O. Eastland in oratorical skill as well as general ability. He will be an important addition to the Senate.

Of segregation, Talmadge, who once urged a boycott of television programs on which white and Negro performers appear together, said:

"Segregation is more important than all other issues at the moment."

Talmadge left no doubt that he aspires to be the leading advocate of white supremacy. In his opening campaign speech, he said he would work for legislation curbing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and prescribing minimum qualifications for appointment.

"During the last two decades, that Court

has chipped steadily away at the reserved rights of the states," he said. "It has sought to change the very framework of our government, not by legal amendment, but through so-called judicial legislation."

This is the pertinent argument of the segregationists, who hope to win the battle on the issue of state sovereignty, an old and familiar Southern contention.

Georgia's Attorney General Eugene Cook, a frequent speaker at meetings of Citizens Councils, goes even further than his former chief executive.

"No man, in my opinion," he said, "can be elected to even a minor office on the state level in at least five states—Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina and Florida—unless he commits himself in a forthright and effective manner to support our pattern of segregation."

The political impact of segregation goes far beyond the race for public office.

The Congressional debate over the bill for federal aid for school construction brought out all the latent struggle. There was no disagreement over the need for more classrooms. The need was too obvious to every man in public life.

But Southern Democrats are traditionally fearful of a federal hand in education, particularly since the issue of mixed schools has come up.

Speaker after speaker rose to debate segregation instead of school construction. Louisiana's Representative George Long, brother of the late Huey and uncle of Senator Russell Long, said:

"Louisiana is not going to integrate. I don't care what kind of a law you pass here."

Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., of New York, put through his amendment, with Republican help, to deny federal funds to school districts which refuse to integrate. After that the bill had no chance. It died, 224 to 119.

Congressmen blamed prejudice and politics for killing the bill. They contrasted the handling of this measure with that of the public highway bill.

Nobody objected to that one too seriously. The need for schools is no less than the need for roads. But the question of segregation does not arise on the public highways.

THE DEMAGOGUE AGAIN

One of the great significances of the issue of segregation in politics is the encouragement of the demagogue.

Once the spokesmen for the South, in the eyes of the nation, were men like Mississippi's Rankin and Bilbo, Alabama's Cotton Tom Hefflin, Georgia's Tom Watson and South Carolina's Pitchfork Ben Tillman.

But the South grew up. Its states are expanding faster, in population, industry, economic power and improved living conditions, than the nation as a whole. New and younger men arose, men like Sparkman of Alabama, Smathers of Florida and Kefauver of Tennessee in the Senate, and Florida's Collins, Tennessee's Clements and Mississippi's Coleman in the offices of governor. They added a stature to Southern statesmanship that had not been known in such depth since Reconstruction.

Most of these leaders considered themselves "moderates," some even "liberals." They understood the South and its ways, but they were aware of change. They soft-pedalled the race issue, instead of exploiting it as did the demagogues, because they were aware of the dangers of racial tension.

The elections this year have opened the eyes of Southern moderates to the power of the segregation issue and the ugly possibilities of its exploitation in a time of tension.

There has been a general drawing back into more conservative patterns, and more vigorous efforts to preserve the status quo, i.e., the complete white dominance of the ballot box, the machinery of government and the economic situation.

This is what faces the Democratic and Republican strategists. Neither party can risk the alienation of liberal Northern votes by the appeasement of Southern supporters. It is quite likely, however, that the candidates will take on the coloration of their local supporters who privately assure prospective voters that high-minded statements for consumption elsewhere do not mean exactly what they say. This is the im-memorial way of politics and segregation provides a lively subject for its use.

The situation in Florida, where Steven-

son's top supporters were segregation spokesmen, was paralleled in other states. For months before the Democratic National Convention, Georgia's Governor Marvin Griffin, an outspoken pleader for white supremacy, worked for Stevenson.

NO THIRD PARTY

Responsible party leaders decried talk of a third party. A Democratic caucus in Atlanta, which drew leaders from seven states, pointed out that those present "represent a section which traditionally is the most loyal of all in the nation to the Democratic party.

"The South should wield strong influence in establishing a program which can be supported unanimously at the national convention.

"The South is gravely disturbed over the invasion of the sovereign rights of the states and the departures from the constitutional guarantees upon which our country was founded."

Hard facts were behind the decision. A Democratic victory would leave Southerners in charge of most of the important committees of Congress, ready and able to slow down the progress of integration and civil rights.

A third party is an extreme protest, a martyrdom that would cost the South dearly.

Political leaders of the deep Southern states, their determination to resist integration hardening, are increasingly confident they can stand off the Supreme Court mandate indefinitely while they work to change the composition of the Supreme Court and national attitudes.

Even such a conservative as Florida's Senator Holland is in this group. He recently listed "judicious care" in confirming future appointees to the Supreme Court as one means of restoring eventually the "separate but equal" doctrine.

Many other Southerners believe steadfastly that public opinion is shifting to an acceptance of the Southern viewpoint. They cite the campaign of many Southern newspapers to play up racial tensions elsewhere . . . a campaign which some Northern newspapers have been forced to join.

One of the big devices of Citizens Councils is a pledge by which its members agree to write letters to friends, relatives and business connections in the North and East, explaining the segregationist viewpoint.

Alabamans felt they won a tremendous moral victory while in the world spotlight during the recent boycott of the city bus system by Negro riders.

Reporters and commentators flocked in to tell of the troubling conflict in the Confederacy's first capital. Gradually, as they met the people, visited the charming old homes which were thrown open to them, heard the soft, easy talk, the tone of the dispatches changed. More and more sympathetic words for the cause of the segregationists crept in.

This is the outcome for which the South-

ern politicians hope . . . the "moderates" who wish to maintain the old ways "within the law" and to avoid violence.

They believe that time will work on their side provided—and this should be stressed—that Southern leaders remain in their positions of control through the Democratic party.

That is the key to the rationalizations, the acceptance of national standard bearers whose platforms may not be all the South might wish, but are well enough for practical purposes of winning.

The South rose from the ashes of Reconstruction and discovered how to circumvent the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Some of her politicians believe, however unrealistically, history will repeat itself.



" . . . You can join with like-minded men and women in the many voluntary associations that promote people-to-people contact around the world. By means of them, the thorny problems of the time are scrutinized from many viewpoints. Solutions are approached by many avenues. Creative thinking is sparked. Mutual understanding is furthered.

"Thus, every thinking person will come to understand that his country's future will be brighter as the lot of mankind improves; that no nation can in the long run prosper except as the world enjoys a growing prosperity. We must indeed be partners for peace and freedom and prosperity if those words are to record achievement as well as to express a dream.

"The foreign policy of this Republic, if it serves the enduring purposes and good of the United States, must always be founded on these truths, thus expressing the enlightened interests of the whole American people. Certainly the basic foreign relations measures taken by the United States in this century have been so developed. They do not belong to any political party—they are American. These measures range from our support of the Organization of American States to our membership in the United Nations and our present programs of partnership and assistance.

"The United Nations by its very comprehensiveness is a unique association within which nations of every political complexion and philosophy have their place. The smaller groupings in which we hold membership are bound together by a respect for common values and principles. They conform, of course, to the United Nations Charter. But in each organization the likeness in background or interest or purpose that characterizes the membership and the restricted geographical limits within which it operates assures more effective discharge of their functions than is possible in a group as large as the United Nations.

"We shall continue in our loyalty to the United Nations. But we should, at the same time, further expand and strengthen our other international associations."

*Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commencement Address,
Baylor University, May 25, 1956.*

"... Barring a second Reconstruction brought on by the race question, the South appears to be ready to support two competitive parties; that is, under the impact of an economic revolution, a world war, and the New Deal, political affairs in the region can no longer be conducted along the traditional lines."

The Changing Southern Vote

BY DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, JR.

Associate Professor of History, Vanderbilt University

MOST Americans have long regarded the southern part of the United States as an anachronism. Even an America grown somewhat stodgy in a world that has become a whirlwind of social and political revolution finds it hard to comprehend a section that deviates so stubbornly from the national norm and whose enduring attitudes and institutions seem to handicap the nation in its leadership of the free world.

Most incomprehensible of all ramifications growing out of the modern South are its politics and race relations. A reference to Southern politics is apt to evoke in the mind of the typical American an image compounded of the Solid South, conservative senators, and race-baiting demagogues. If he pushes his thinking back into history, the non-Southerner may summon to mind a sectional politics based on prohibition, the Ku Klux Klan, and religious fundamentalism, or on Negro disfranchisement and Bourbon policies. Whatever he thinks, he pictures Southern politics as a national aberration. And to some extent he is right.

But the old clichés so often used to characterize political affairs south of the Mason and Dixon Line were never entirely ac-

curate and during the last decade they have become even less valid. The Dixiecrat movement in 1948 and the Republican victories in the South in 1952 represented, in a sense, the climax of a long revolt or counter-movement against the New Deal. The full implications of these two elections, particularly that of 1952, are not yet fully apparent; but it is clear that they were expressions of two streams of protest which had long been building up against the Roosevelt and Truman administrations.

For all its economic overtones, the Dixiecrat movement was essentially a matter of race, a revolt against the national party's orientation toward Negro voters in the North and the culmination of a long series of developments that irritated the South. Logically enough, the strongest appeal of the States Righters was in those Black Belt areas which V. O. Key describes as the hard core of the Solid South. Many Southerners were disturbed by the New Deal's "coddling" of the Negro and troubled by the implications of American democratic war aims, as well as by such wartime developments as the commission on employment practices. They had their worst fears realized in Truman's civil rights recommendations.

Although the Democratic party weathered the crisis precipitated by the Dixiecrat revolt, the recent Supreme Court decisions on school segregation have added fuel to the fire of this line of Southern protest.

Less spectacular but probably of more importance in the long run were the Republican successes in the South in 1952. What happened in 1952 was not unrelated to the schism of 1948, but the basic explanation

Dewey W. Grantham is Associate Professor of History at Vanderbilt University. He has published several articles on the South and is at present engaged in writing a book on post-Reconstruction politics in the South.

of the large Republican vote in the South in 1952 lies in the long dissatisfaction, primarily for economic reasons, on the part of many Southern Democrats with New Deal policies.

This Southern distaste for New Deal liberalism had already begun to reveal itself in such sporadic movements as the "Constitutional Democrats of Texas" in 1936, the "Jeffersonian Democratic" party of South Carolina in 1940, and the "Texas Regulars" in 1944. But by 1952 it had grown strong enough to burst out of the old boundaries vigorously and in doing so it revealed some of the profound social and economic forces on which it rested.

Economic Change

The most significant of the latent political developments now evident in Southern politics are associated with the economic revolution that is industrializing and urbanizing the South, diversifying its economy, and effecting a large migration into and out of the region. Rejuvenated by the New Deal and vastly stimulated by the war, the Southern economy is experiencing the flush days of a boom. Factories and assembling plants have sprung up throughout the South; agriculture has been increasingly mechanized and diversified; sharecroppers and agricultural workers in large numbers have left the farms for the cities of the North and South, while a growing stream of technicians, managers, and businessmen has come into the region.

As the current quip has it: "Cotton is going West, cattle are coming East, Negroes are going North, and Yankees are coming South." Most Southerners are enjoying a degree of prosperity altogether new, and a broad new middle class, as well as a liberal sprinkling of *nouveau riche*, has emerged in the cities.

One measure of the transformation under way in the South is the growing urbanization of the area, a process now taking place relatively more rapidly than in the Northeast. Between 1930 and 1950, for example, the growth of cities of 50,000 or more in the South proceeded at a rate three times the national average. In their assiduous efforts to industrialize their section, Southerners

seem curiously unable or unwilling to comprehend the likelihood that economic innovations will ultimately change their social and political institutions.

Yet the economic revolution in the South is surely breaking the cake of social custom. New jobs and new faces mean new ideas and habits. Urbanization means the decline of ruralism and the creation of an atmosphere in which old loyalties and prejudices are less potent, and in which workers are likely to join labor unions, and Negroes, to vote.

An important consequence of these developments, as Alexander Heard has said so well, is to create divisive influences in Southern politics and to sharpen social and economic issues in such a way as to cut into the traditional political domination of the Black Belts. The recent economic changes in a state like Texas, where a phenomenal era of prosperity and population advance has come into being, would seem to provide a solid basis for such political divisions.

The respectable elements of a rapidly growing middle class, as well as the wealthy oil and cattle men, find the policies of Harry Truman anathema and the ideas of Robert A. Taft more and more attractive. Negroes, farmers and urban workers, on the other hand, tend to support the Fair Deal. These economic and social cleavages, categorized above in their relationship to national party positions, also find expression on the state level within the one-party system, but in a halting and confused fashion.

When viewed against this background, the Republican successes of 1952 in the South were far more than an Eisenhower victory. They represent what Professor Key calls "the political fulfillment of demographic and economic trends" in the region. The number of "Presidential Republicans" grew steadily in the South in the 1940's, but the election of 1952 was the event that set off the explosive forces long building up there.

The significant thing about 1952 was not that it inaugurated a full-blown two-party system in Dixie—that is obviously not true—but that an analysis of the election returns shows that the South, especially the cities, divided its votes much as did the rest of the country and for pretty much the same reasons.

In city after city in the South, Eisenhower carried the upper-income precincts by handsome majorities (and a great many of the middle-income precincts by less handsome margins), while Stevenson carried the lower-income districts by equally large majorities. Furthermore, the recurrent cleavages within the Democratic party in the South tended to be reflected in the vote for Eisenhower and Stevenson. In a general way all this means that the nationalizing forces that have been forcing a national party realignment since the 1920's have at last begun to affect the South.

The "New Negro"

Closely related to the rapid industrialization and urbanization taking place below the Potomac is what we may call the rise of the "New Negro"—far better educated and far stronger economically than his brother of a generation ago. Equally important has been the return of Negroes to a position of consequence in Southern politics during the last decade. The large increase of Negro voters in the South, following the famous *Smith v. Allwright* decision of 1944, which opened the white primaries to Negroes, represents a revolution in Southern voting habits.

Negroes still find it difficult to vote in many places in the Deep South, but they are voting in every Southern state. The Southern Regional Council estimated the number of registered Negro voters in the former Confederate states at over a million by late 1952. More than 128,000 Negroes had registered in Florida by 1954 as compared with 20,000 in 1944.

The mere fact of Negro voting in the South in such spectacular numbers is very significant, but it may be equally significant to point out that these Negroes are Democrats who tend to vote in national politics like Negroes do in Philadelphia and New York. If this orientation finds its way into state politics, it may well represent as important a development for the future of Southern politics as would the threatened exodus of well-to-do Southerners from the Democratic party.

If the election of 1952 gave expression to long-accumulating pressures pushing toward

a political realignment in the South, the Dixiecrat movement of 1948 emphasized the powerful compulsions that are acting as a damper on such a realignment. For all the changes that are swirling over the South, the old sectionalism retains some of its fire and the region holds on to its traditions. Ellen Glasgow had one of her characters in *Barren Ground* say that "people will fight to stay in a rut, but not to get out of it."

In a way, that characterizes the way in which the present South is fighting to keep its old way of life, or at least certain parts of it. There is still much truth in what Virginius Dabney wrote in 1942. "Many Southerners who currently profess allegiance to the Democratic party," Dabney declared, "would be far more congenially situated as Republicans if they could but forget Thad Stevens and Ben Wade, and put out of their minds the fact that to their grandfathers the Democratic party was only slightly less sacrosanct than the Army of Northern Virginia."

But Southern sectionalism is fired by more than tradition. It is almost as if Southerners derive some masochistic satisfaction from picturing themselves as the champions of a defeated cause and of an outworn tradition. At the same time, there is a genuine conservative tradition in the region and many Southerners look with pride to the Jeffersonian elements associated with it.

Certain aspects of the situation in the South serve further to slow down the development of a two-party system in the area. Most important, perhaps, is the leadership of men like Harry Flood Byrd, Walter F. George, and Clyde Hoey—men who advocate honest, efficient and responsible government but who vote like Republicans. The practical question is easily put. Why should conservative voters in the South vote for Republican opponents of these men? Why especially when these and many less responsible Southern congressmen, operating from powerful committee positions, have perfected an informal coalition with Republicans in Congress that can destroy the effectiveness of the Office of Price Administration, pass the Taft-Hartley bill over the President's veto, and in general frustrate liberal plans?

Similarly, as long as conservatives who call themselves Democrats can control the state

governments in the South, there is no place for a separate conservative party led by Republicans. For the most part Southern Republican leaders, satisfied with Democratic control on the state level and primarily interested in convention politics and patronage in Washington, have not wanted to win elections at home. As significant as were the Republican successes in 1952, it is well to remember that few Republican congressmen and local officials were elected that year, and even fewer in 1954. The number of registered Republicans below the Potomac remains very small.

Southern liberals have no place to go, surrounded as they are by the conservatives of both parties. Their polar star must remain the Democratic party at the national level. At home they are forced into the Procrustean bed with the dominant conservatives, hoping for a broad liberal movement like the New Deal to give them local ascendancy for a time. Still, a sustained period of state control by a liberal faction such as Governor James E. Folsom's forces in Alabama or the anti-Shivers wing of the party in Texas would probably serve as a powerful incentive for conservative Southerners to enter the Republican party.

Another factor that may influence the movement of Southerners into the Republican party is the growing participation of Negroes in the Democratic primaries, usually on the side of the liberal factions. Many white Southerners are disturbed by the claims that Negroes vote in blocs. Samuel Lubell found that Negroes voted heavily for Frank P. Graham and Claude Pepper in the 1950 primaries, but that the large Negro vote for these two Southern liberals provoked an even larger opposition turnout by whites.

The situation is complicated, however, by the new upsurge of race feeling in the South. The Eisenhower Administration has become less attractive to many Southerners because it is tarred with the integration brush. Furthermore, the current preoccupation with race

difficulties is likely to mute the factional conflict in the South and thus tend to gloss over the economic and social divisions in the party that would normally promote the chances of a two-party system. "Not since the last act of Hamlet," observes Professor Dennis Brogan, "has there been such mixed scuffling as in the South since 1948."

Whatever the immediate future may bring, it is extremely improbable that the shock registered in the South as a result of the large Republican gains in 1952 will disappear entirely. It seems altogether likely that the emergence of a two-party system in Dixie will proceed in a series of spurts, as in 1928 and 1952, with each leap ahead being followed by a partial loss before the next one occurs.

Republican successes may also depend upon the priority assigned to the region by national leaders. During the next few years Republican gains in the South will probably occur only on the national level, with occasional state and congressional victories coming first in states like Florida, Tennessee and Texas, where the party already has the basic organization.

The process of building an opposition party is a slow business at best. It should be remembered that only a few of the 48 states have a real competitive party system. All that we can say is that, barring a second Reconstruction brought on by the race question, the South appears to be ready to support two competitive parties; that is, under the impact of an economic revolution, a world war, and the New Deal, political affairs in the region can no longer be conducted along the traditional lines.

It would be a foolish man who would predict when these developments will be fully realized. But it is not too hazardous to predict that if given half a chance in the South of today, Texas oil men and Carolina textile magnates, not to mention their white collar employees, will range themselves on different sides of political questions from Negroes, organized labor and small farmers.

Few Farms in United States

The United States had 6,812,000 farms in 1935 compared with 4,792,000 today.

World Documents

THE PARTY PLATFORMS, 1956

ON AUGUST 15, the Democratic National Convention, meeting in Chicago, accepted a party platform that compromised the differences between the Northern and the Southern wings. On August 21, the Republican National Convention in San Francisco reached agreement on the first platform it has drafted during a Republican administration since 1932. Here are excerpts from the major provisions in each of the platforms:

Foreign Policy as Seen by the Two Parties

DEMOCRATS

The world's hopes for lasting peace depend upon the conduct of our foreign policy, a function which the Constitution vests in the President of the United States and one which has not been effectively exercised by President Eisenhower. Since 1953, responsibility for foreign affairs has been President Eisenhower's, his alone, and his in full. In the past three years, his conduct of our policies has moved us into realms where we risk grave danger. He has failed to seek peace with determination, for his disarmament policy has failed to strike hard at the institution of war. His handling of the day by day problems of international affairs has unnecessarily and dangerously subjected the American people to the risk of . . . war.

We need bold leadership, yet in the three years since Stalin's death, in the full year since President Eisenhower's meeting at the "Summit," the Republican Administration has not offered a single concrete new idea to meet the new-style political and economic offensive of the Soviets, which represents, potentially, an even graver challenge than Stalin's use of force. . . .

We need to make our peaceful purpose clear beyond dispute in every corner of the world—yet Dulles brags of "brinks of war." We need a foreign policy which rises above jockeying for partisan position or advantage—yet, not in memory has there been so little bipartisanship in the administration of our

REPUBLICANS

Under the leadership of President Eisenhower, the United States has advanced foreign policies which enable our people to enjoy the blessings of liberty and peace.

The changes in the international scene have been so great that it is easy to forget the conditions we inherited in 1953.

Peace, so hardly won in 1945, had again been lost. The Korean war, with its tragic toll of more than an eighth of a million American casualties, seemed destined to go on indefinitely. Its material costs and accompanying inflation were undermining our economy.

Freedom was under assault, and despotism was on the march. Armed conflict continued in the Far East, and tensions mounted elsewhere.

The threat of global war increased daily.

International communism which, in 1945, ruled the 200,000,000 people in the Soviet Union and Baltic States, was conquering so that by 1952, it dominated more than 700,000,000 people in fifteen once-independent nations.

Now, we are at peace.

The Korean war has been ended. The Communist aggressors have been denied their goals.

The threat of global war has receded.

The advance of communism has been checked, and, at key points, thrown back. The once-monolithic structure of interna-

policies, so little candor in their presentation to our people, so much pretending that things are better than they are.

tional communism, denied the stimulant of successive conquests, has shown hesitancy both internally and abroad.

Problems of the Middle East

DEMOCRATS

The Democratic party stands for the maintenance of peace in the Middle East which is essential for the well-being and progress of all its peoples.

We will urge Israel and the Arab states to settle their differences by peaceful means, and to maintain the sanctity of the holy places and permit free access to them.

We will assist Israel to build a sound and viable economy for her people, so that she may fulfill her humanitarian mission of providing shelter and sanctuary for her homeless Jewish refugees while strengthening her national development.

We will assist the Arab states to develop their economic resources and raise the living standard of their people. The plight of the Arab refugees commands our continuing sympathy and concern. We will assist in carrying out large-scale projects for their resettlement in countries where there is room and opportunity for them.

We support the principle of free access to the Suez Canal under suitable international auspices. The present policies of the Eisenhower Administration in the Middle East are unnecessarily increasing the risk that war will break out in this area. To prevent war, to assure peace we will faithfully carry out our country's pledge under the tripartite declaration of 1950 to oppose the use of threat of force and to take such action as may be necessary, in the interest of peace, both within and outside the United Nations to prevent any violation of the frontiers of armistice lines.

The Democratic party will act to redress the dangerous imbalance of arms in the area created by the shipment of Communist arms to Egypt, by selling or supplying defensive weapons to Israel, and will take such steps, including security guarantees, as may be required to deter aggression and war in the area.

REPUBLICANS

The Middle East has been strengthened by the defensive unity of the four "northern tier" countries—Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan—which hold gateways to the vast oil resources upon which depend the industry and military strength of the free world. This was made possible by the liberation of Iran from the grip of the Communist Tudeh party. Iran has again made its oil reserves available to the world under an equitable settlement negotiated by the United States.

We have maintained, and will maintain friendly relations with all nations in this vital area, seeking to mediate differences among them, and encouraging their legitimate national aspirations.

We recognize the existence of a major threat to international peace in the Near East. We support a policy of impartial friendship for the peoples of the Arab states and Israel to promote a peaceful settlement of the causes of tension in that area, including the human problem of the Palestine-Arab refugees.

Progress toward a just settlement of the tragic conflict between the Jewish state and the Arab nations in Palestine was upset by the Soviet bloc sale of arms to Arab countries. But prospects of peace have now been reinforced by the mission to Palestine of the United Nations Secretary General upon the initiative of the United States.

We regard the preservation of Israel as an important tenet of American foreign policy. We are determined that the integrity of an independent Jewish state shall be maintained. We shall support the independence of Israel against armed aggression. The best hope for peace in the Middle East lies in the United Nations. We pledge our continued efforts to eliminate the obstacles to a lasting peace in this area.

Recognition of Red China

DEMOCRATS

We pledge determined opposition to the admission of the Communist Chinese into the United Nations. They have proven their complete hostility to the purposes of this organization. We pledge continued support to Nationalist China.

REPUBLICANS

We continue to oppose the seating of Communist China in the United Nations, thus upholding international morality. To seat a Communist China which defies, by word and deed, the principles of the United Nations Charter would be to betray the letter, violate the spirit, and subvert the purposes of that Charter. It would betray our friend and ally, the Republic of China.

National Defense as Seen by the Two Parties

DEMOCRATS

We reject the false Republican notion that this country can afford only a second-best defense. We stand for strong defense forces so clearly superior in modern weapons to those of any possible enemy that our armed strength will make an attack upon the free world unthinkable and thus be a major force for world peace. The Republican administration of our armed forces stands indicted for failing to recognize the necessity of proper living standards for the men and women of our armed forces and their families.

We pledge ourselves to the betterment of the living conditions of the members of our armed services and a needed increase in the so-called "fringe benefits."

The Democratic party pledges itself to a bold and imaginative program devised to fully utilize the brain power of America's youth as a guarantee of unquestioned supremacy in the scientific and technical fields.

Scholarships and loan assistance and such other steps as determined desirable must be employed to secure these objectives. This is in the interest of necessary and adequate national defense. . . .

Advances in nuclear weapons have made existing civil defense legislation obsolete.

We pledge ourselves to establish a real program for protecting the civilian population and industry of our nation in place of the present weak and ineffective program. We believe that this is essentially a Federal responsibility.

REPUBLICANS

The military strength of the United States has been a key factor in the preservation of world peace during the past four years. We are determined to maintain that strength so long as our security and the peace of the world require it. . . .

To achieve this objective, we must depend upon attracting to, and retaining in our military services vigorous and well-trained manpower, and upon continuously maintaining in reserve an enthusiastic and well-informed group of men and women. This will require incentives that will make armed service careers attractive and rewarding. A substantial start has been made toward bolstering the rewards and benefits that accompany a military career. We must continue to provide them.

In order that American youth in our armed services shall be provided with the most modern weapons, we have supported, and will continue to support, an effective and well-directed program of research and development, staffed by men of the highest caliber and ability in this field. . . .

We pledge ourselves to stimulate and encourage the education of our young people in the sciences with a determination to maintain our technological leadership.

In this age of weapons of inconceivable destructiveness, we must not neglect the protection of the civilian population by all known means, while at the same time preparing our armed forces for every eventuality.

Reciprocal Trade

DEMOCRATS

The Democratic party has always worked for expanding trade among free nations. Expanding world trade is necessary, not only for our friends but for ourselves; it is the way to meet America's growing need for industrial raw materials. We shall continue to support vigorously the Hull reciprocal trade program.

Under Democratic Administrations, the operation of this act was conducted in a manner that recognized equities for agriculture, industry and labor. Under the present Republican Administration there has been a very flagrant disregard of these important segments of our economy resulting in serious economic injury to hundreds of thousands of Americans engaged in these pursuits. We pledge correction of these conditions.

REPUBLICANS

Recognizing economic health is an indispensable basis of military strength and world peace, we shall strive to foster abroad and to practice at home, policies to encourage productivity and profitable trade.

Barriers which impede international trade and the flow of capital should be reduced on a gradual, selective and reciprocal basis, with full recognition of the necessity to safeguard domestic enterprises, agriculture and labor against unfair import competition. We proudly point out that the Republican party was primarily responsible for initiating the escape clause and peril point provisions of law to make effective the necessary safeguards for American agriculture, labor and business. We pledge faithful and expeditious administration of these provisions.

Domestic Policy as Seen by the Two Parties

Conflicting Views of Immigration Policies

DEMOCRATS

America's long tradition of hospitality and asylum for those seeking freedom and opportunity and escape from oppression has been besmirched by the delays, failures and broken promises of the Republican Administration. The Democratic party favors prompt revision of the immigration and nationality laws to eliminate unfair provisions under which admissions to this country depend upon quotas based upon the accident of national origin. Proper safeguards against subversive elements should be provided. Our procedures must reflect the principles of our Bill of Rights.

We favor eliminating the provisions of law which charge displaced persons admitted to our shores against quotas for future years. Through such "mortgages" of quotas, thousands of qualified persons are being forced to wait long years before they can hope for admission. We also favor more liberal ad-

REPUBLICANS

The Republican Party supports an immigration policy which is in keeping with the traditions of America in providing a haven for oppressed peoples, and which is based on equality of treatment, freedom from implications of discriminations between racial, nationality and religious groups, and flexible enough to conform to changing needs and conditions.

We believe that such a policy serves our self-interest, reflects our responsibility for world leadership and develops maximum cooperation with other nations in resolving problems in this area.

We support the President's program submitted to the Eighty-fourth Congress to carry out needed modifications in existing law and to take such further steps as may be necessary to carry out our traditional policy.

In that concept, the Republican Admin-

mission of relatives to eliminate the unnecessary tragedies of broken families. We favor elimination of unnecessary distinctions between native-born and naturalized citizens. There should be no "second-class" citizenship in the United States.

The administration of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 has been a disgrace to our country. Rescue has been denied to innocent, defenseless and suffering people, the victims of war and the aftermath of wars. The purpose of the act has been defeated by Republican mismanagement.

Conflicting Views of Fiscal Policy

DEMOCRATS

A fully expanding economy can yield enough tax revenue to meet the inescapable obligations of government, balance the Federal budget and lighten the tax burden. The immediate need is to correct the inequities in the tax structure which reflect the Republican determination to favor the few at the expense of the many. We favor realistic tax adjustments, giving first consideration to small independent business and the small individual taxpayer. Lower income families need tax relief; only a Democratic victory will assure this. We favor an increase in the present personal tax exemption of \$600 to a minimum of at least \$800.

The Republican debt management policy of higher interest rate serves only to benefit a few to the detriment of the general taxpayer, the small borrower, and the small and middle class investor in Government bonds. We pledge ourselves to a vigilant review of our debt management policy in order to reduce interest rates in the service of our common welfare.

Effective administration of the Federal securities laws has been undermined by Republican appointees with conflicting interests. Millions of investors who have bought securities with their savings are today without adequate protection. We favor vigorous administration and revision of the laws to provide investor safeguards for securities extensively traded in the Over-the-Counter Market, for foreign securities distributed in the United States and against proxy contest abuses.

istration sponsored the Refugee Relief Act to provide asylum for thousands of refugees, expellees and displaced persons, and undertook in the face of Democrat opposition to correct the inequities in existing law and to bring our immigration policies in line with the dynamic needs of the country and principles of equity and justice.

We believe also that the Congress should consider the extension of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 in resolving this difficult refugee problem which resulted from world conflict. To all this we give our . . . support.

REPUBLICANS

The Republican party takes pride in calling attention to the outstanding fiscal achievements of the Eisenhower Administration.

In order to progress further in correcting the unfortunate results of unwise financial management during twenty years of Democrat Administrations, we pledge to pursue the following objectives:

Further reductions in Government spending as recommended in the Hoover Commission Report, without weakening the support of a superior defense program or depreciating the quality of essential service of Government to our people.

Continued balancing of the budget . . . Gradual reduction of the national debt.

Then, in so far as consistent with a balanced budget, we pledge to work toward:

Further reductions in taxes with particular consideration for low and middle income families.

Initiation of a sound policy of tax reductions which will encourage small independent businesses to modernize and progress.

Consistent with the Republican administration's accomplishment in stemming the inflation—which under five Democrat administrations had cut the value of the dollar in half, and so had robbed the wage earner and millions of thrifty citizens who had savings, pensions and insurance—we endorse the present policy of freedom for the federal reserve system to combat inflation and deflation by wise fiscal policy.

Conflicting Views of Labor Policy

DEMOCRATS

Harmonious labor-management relations are productive of good incomes for wage earners and conducive to rising output from our factories. We believe that, to the widest possible extent consistent with the public interest, management and labor should determine wage rates and conditions of employment through free collective bargaining.

The Taft-Hartley Act passed by the Republican-dominated Eightieth Congress seriously impaired this relationship as established in the Wagner National Labor Relations Act, enacted under the Roosevelt Administration. The act protected, encouraged and guaranteed the rights of workers to organize and join unions of their own choice, and to bargain collectively through these unions without coercion.

The vicious anti-union character of Taft-Hartley was expressly recognized by Candidate Eisenhower during the 1952 election campaign.

At that time, he made solemn promise to eliminate its unjust provisions and re-enact a fair law. President Eisenhower and his Administration have failed utterly, however, to display any Executive initiative or forcefulness to keep this pledge to American workers. He was further responsible for administratively amending Taft-Hartley into a more intensely anti-labor weapon by stacking the National Labor Relations Board with biased pro-management personnel who transformed the act into a management weapon by administrative decision. Among such decisions was the removal of millions of workers from the jurisdiction of the N. L. R. B. which, in many cases, left them without either state or Federal protective legislation. . . .

We commend the action of the Democratic Eighty-fourth Congress which raised the minimum wage from 75 cents to \$1.00 an hour despite the strenuous objection of President Eisenhower and the Republicans in Congress. However the inadequacies of the minimum wage become apparent as the cost of living increases, and we feel it im-

REPUBLICANS

Under the Republican Administration, as our country has prospered, so have its people. This is as it should be, for as President Eisenhower said: "Labor is the United States. The men and women, who with their minds, their hearts and hands, create the wealth that is shared in this country—they are America."

The Eisenhower Administration has brought to our people the highest employment, the highest wages and the highest standard of living ever enjoyed by any nation. Today there are nearly 67,000,000 men and women at work in the United States, 4,000,000 more than in 1952. Wages have increased substantially over the past three and a half years; but, more important, the American wage earner today can buy more than ever before for himself and his family because his pay check has not been eaten away by rising taxes and soaring prices.

The record of performance of the Republican Administration on behalf of our working men and women goes still further. The Federal minimum wage has been raised for more than 2,000,000 workers. Social Security has been extended to an additional 10,000,000 workers and the benefits raised for 6,500,000. The protection of unemployment insurance has been brought to 4,000,000 additional workers. There have been increased workmen's compensation benefits for longshoremen and harbor workers; increased retirement benefits. In addition, the Eisenhower Administration has enforced more vigorously and effectively than ever before the laws which protect the working standards of our people.

Workers have benefited by the progress which has been made in carrying out the programs and principles set forth in the 1952 Republican platform. All workers have gained and unions have grown in strength and responsibility, and have increased their membership by two millions.

perative to raise the minimum wage to at least \$1.25 an hour, more closely to approximate present day needs.

Conflicting Views on Civil Rights

DEMOCRATS

1. The Democratic party is committed to support and advance the individual rights and liberties of all Americans. Our country is founded on the proposition that all men are created equal. This means that all citizens are equal before the law and should enjoy all political rights. They should have equal opportunities for education, for economic advancement, and for decent living conditions.

2. We will continue our efforts to eradicate discrimination based on race, religion or national origin. We know this task requires action, not just in one section of the nation, but in all sections. It requires the cooperative efforts of individual citizens, and action by state and local governments. It also requires Federal action. The Federal government must live up to the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and must exercise the powers vested in it by the Constitution.

3. We are proud of the record of the Democratic party in securing equality of treatment and opportunity in the nation's armed forces, the civil service, and in all areas under Federal jurisdiction. The Democratic party pledges itself to continue its efforts to eliminate illegal discriminations of all kinds, in relation to (1) Full rights to vote, (2) Full rights to engage in gainful occupations, (3) Full rights to enjoy security of the person, and (4) Full rights to education in all publicly supported institutions.

4. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relating to segregation in publicly supported schools and elsewhere have brought consequences of vast importance to our nation as a whole and especially to communities directly affected. We reject all proposals for the use of force to interfere with the orderly determination of these matters by the courts.

REPUBLICANS

The Republican party points to an impressive record of accomplishments in the field of civil rights and commits itself anew to advancing the rights of all our people regardless of race, creed, color or national origin.

In the area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction, more progress has been made in this field under the present Republican Administration than in any similar period in the last eighty years. . .

Segregation has been ended in the District of Columbia government and in the district public facilities, including public schools, restaurants, theatres and playgrounds. The Eisenhower Administration has eliminated discrimination in all Federal employment.

Great progress has been made in eliminating employment discrimination on the part of those who do business with the Federal Government and secure Federal contracts. This Administration has impartially enforced Federal civil-rights statutes, and we pledge that it will continue to do so. We support the enactment of the civil-rights program already presented by the President to the second session of the Eighty-fourth Congress.

The regulatory agencies under this Administration have moved vigorously to end discrimination in interstate commerce. Segregation in the active armed forces of the United States has been ended. For the first time in our history there is no segregation in veterans' hospitals and among civilians on naval bases. This is an impressive record. We pledge ourselves to continued progress in this field.

The Republican party has unequivocally recognized that the supreme law of the land is embodied in the Constitution, which guarantees to all people the blessing of liberty, due process and equal protection of the laws.

The Democratic party emphatically reaffirms its support of the historic principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men; it recognizes the Supreme Court of the United States as one of the three Constitutional and coordinated branches of the Federal government, superior to and separate from any political party, the decisions of which are part of the law of the land. We condemn the efforts of the Republican party to make it appear that this tribunal is a part of the Republican party.

5. We condemn the Republican Administration's violation of the rights of government employees by a heartless and unjustified confusing of "security" and "loyalty" for the sole purpose of political gain and regardless of consequences to individual victims and to the good name of the United States. We condemn the Republican Administration's misrepresentation of facts and violation of individual rights in a wicked and unprincipled attempt to degrade and destroy the Democratic party, and to make political capital for the Republican party.

It confers upon all native-born and naturalized citizens not only citizenship in the state where the individual resides but citizenship of the United States as well. This is an unqualified right, regardless of race, creed or color.

The Republican party accepts the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court that racial discrimination in publicly supported schools must be progressively eliminated. We concur in the conclusion of the Supreme Court that its decision directing school desegregation should be accomplished with "all deliberate speed" locally through Federal district courts. The implementation order of the Supreme Court recognizes the complex and acutely emotional problems created by its decision in certain sections of our country where racial patterns have been developed in accordance with prior and long-standing decisions of the same tribunal.

We believe that true progress can be attained through intelligent study, understanding, education and goodwill. Use of force or violence by any group or agency will tend only to worsen the many problems inherent in the situation. This progress must be encouraged and the work of the courts supported in every legal manner by all branches of the Federal Government to the end that the constitutional ideal of equality before the law, regardless of race, creed or color, will be steadily achieved.

Conflicting Views on Agriculture

DEMOCRATS

Specifically, we denounce President Eisenhower's veto of the constructive legislation proposed and passed by the Democratic Eighty-fourth Congress to reverse the alarming fall of farm prices and restore farmers to a position of first-class economic citizenship in the sharing of benefits from American productive ability.

We also condemn the Republican Administration for its abandonment of the true principles of soil conservation and for its destruction of the Soil Conservation Service. We pledge to support continued im-

REPUBLICANS

Farm legislation, developed under the Democratic Administration to stimulate production in wartime, carried a built-in mechanism for the accumulation of price-depressing surpluses in peacetime. Under laws sponsored by the Republican Administration, almost \$7,000,000,000 in price-depressing surplus farm products have been moved into use, and the rate of movement is being accelerated.

* * *

Convinced that the Government should ever be the farmer's helper, never his mas-

provements in the soil bank program passed by the Democratic Eighty-fourth Congress and originally opposed by President Eisenhower and Secretary Ezra Taft Benson. We deplore the diversion of this conservation program into a direct vote-buying scheme.

In order to regain the ground lost during the Eisenhower Administration, and in order better to serve both consumers and producers, the Democratic party pledges continuous and vigorous support to the following policies:

- Sponsor a positive and comprehensive program to conserve our soil, water and forest resources for future generations;

- Promote programs which will protect and preserve the family type farm as a bulwark of American life and encourage farm-home ownership, including additional assistance to family farmers and young farmers in the form of specially designed credit and price support programs, technical aid and enlarged soil conservation allowances;

- Maintain adequate reserves of agricultural commodities strategically located, for national security purposes. Such stockpiles should be handled as necessary strategic reserves, so that farmers will not be penalized by depressed prices for their efficiency and diligence in producing abundance. . . .

- Repeal the Eisenhower flexible, collapsible price supports and restore supports on basic commodities at 90 per cent of parity, as provided in the bill vetoed by President Eisenhower and regain the full 100 per cent of parity farmers received under Democratic Administrations. We will achieve this by means of commodity loans, direct purchases, direct payments to producers, marketing agreements and orders, production adjustments, or a combination of these and other appropriate measures.

- Continue to advocate practical measures for extending price supports to feed grains and other nonbasic storables and to the producers of perishable commodities such as meat, poultry, dairy products, and the like.

"The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge . . . which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism."

George Washington's Farewell Address, September 19, 1796.

ter, the Republican party is pledged:

To establish an effective, new research program, fully and completely implemented to find and vigorously promote new uses for farm crops;

To move our agriculture commodities into use at home and abroad, and to use every appropriate and effective means to improve marketing, so that the farmers can produce and sell their products to increase their income and enjoy an improving level of living.

To encourage the improvement of quality in farm products through agricultural research, education and price support differentials, thus increasing market acceptance both at home and abroad;

To further help and cooperate with the several states as co-equals with the Federal Government to provide needed research, education, service and regulatory programs;

To develop farm programs that are fair to all farmers;

To work toward full freedom instead of toward more regimentation, developing voluntary rather than oppressive farm programs;

To encourage agricultural producers in their efforts to seek solutions to their own production and price problems;

To provide price supports as in the Agricultural Act of 1954 that protect farmers, rather than price their products out of the market;

To continue our commodity loan and marketing agreement programs as effective marketing tools;

To make every effort to develop a more accurate measurement of farm parity;

To safeguard our precious soil and water resources for generations yet unborn.

Received At Our Desk

American History and Politics

A CATHOLIC RUNS FOR PRESIDENT. THE CAMPAIGN OF 1928. By EDMUND A. MOORE. (New York: The Ronald Press, 1956. 200 pages, references and index, \$3.50).

In 1928, as in 1956, it may be said that prosperity was the key issue in the election. Nonetheless, the fact that Alfred E. Smith was a Catholic played a very important but not widely publicized part in his defeat. The significance of the religious issue is analyzed by the Chairman of the History Department at the University of Connecticut, who describes the "campaign within a campaign" to defeat Al Smith because of his religious beliefs. As the author knows well, there were "concomitant social issues of great importance," and he lists them: "Prohibition, the race question, immigration, snobbery, and a determination that the highest office in the land must not be held by someone thought to be alien to the American tradition." Still, these were interwoven with anti-Catholicism in 1928; a belief in a "Catholic taboo" remains, despite the author's conclusion that there is no unwritten law against a Catholic American President. This study documents a shameful campaign in American politics and does it cogently and well.

HERBERT HOOVER. By HAROLD WOLFE. (New York: Exposition Press, 1956. 487 pages, sources and index, \$5.00).

Here is a one-volume biography of Herbert Hoover, "Public Servant and Leader of the Loyal Opposition," by the head of the Department of History and Government at Winthrop College. "That

the worst depression in American history should come during his administration was a grim personal tragedy for Herbert Hoover," notes this biographer, who traces the effects of the depression on Hoover's later career. The bitterness of the attacks against the former president in turn have embittered him. This detailed story of Hoover's life since his boyhood in a Quaker household in Iowa ends with a note of optimism: "On his eighty-first birthday Hoover seemed to have mellowed somewhat. . . . Maybe he will come to forgive and forget the criticisms which embittered him for so long. . . . If he can do so, forget partisan politics and become convinced that America can grow stronger and greater even if it does not follow his advice always, his later years can be crowned with an elder statesmanship, serving leaders of both parties."

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE TRIUMPH. By FRANK FREIDEL. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956. 433 pages, notes, index, and illustrations, \$6.00).

This is the third volume in the "definitive" biography of Roosevelt, which culminates in his election to the presidency in 1932. This volume traces the drive to the highest office from Roosevelt's earliest days as governor of New York in 1928. The material in this book is well handled and a picture of Roosevelt as an extremely adept politician evolves. The account of Roosevelt's formative years as governor of New York which occupies a great deal of this book is interesting because of the personality involved and because of the description of the political influence of an organization like Tammany.

ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOX. By JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956. 553 pages with note, bibliography and index, \$5.75).

In so far as this and the above book deal with the same material, the above seems to have a better grasp of the material. It is of interest to note that both authors have very often drawn on the same examples to illustrate their points. However, Mr. Burns covers a great deal of ground. He traces the life of President Roosevelt in this one volume. Roosevelt seen in his role of leader of the U. S. during a most crucial period is a picture which the author paints as neither black nor white but rather as the picture of a man caught in the exigencies of the '30's, who had to be both lion and fox in order to scare the wolves and recognize traps.

PURITANISM IN OLD AND NEW ENGLAND. By ALAN SIMPSON. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. 126 pages, notes and index, \$3.00).

According to Professor Simpson, Puritanism had its origins in Elizabethan England where its original emphasis on a strong state to support the church later shifted to a demand for a church free from political interference. In this terse but highly urbane statement of Puritanism, Alan Simpson has proven himself to be an able commentator. Although he discusses Puritanism as an historical movement which "goes through the typical history of self-discovery, enthusiasm, organization and decay," its historical impact is also examined. The underlying bond in Puritanism, past and present, in Old and New England, is a passionate righteousness which, in times of stress, superseded individual liberty and freedom of conscience, despite their importance.

THE MILITANT SOUTH. By JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. 249 pages, bibliography, footnotes and index, \$5.00).

Believing that "Violence was inextricably woven into the most fundamental aspects of life in the South and constituted

an important phase of the total experience of its people," the Chairman of the History Department at Brooklyn College traces the influence of the military tradition—the "widespread bellicosity"—on the culture of the *ante bellum* South. "The martial spirit had reached beyond the formal military groups, extending itself into every phase of life, transforming most institutions into semi-military agencies and establishing forms of control which flourished in such an atmosphere." The inter-relationship between the institution of slavery, racism and the militant South is clearly drawn and reminds the reader of analyses of Prussian militarism.

ESCAPE FROM RECONSTRUCTION. By W. C. NUNN. (Texas: Texas Christian University, 1956. 114 pages, footnotes, bibliography and index, \$2.50).

Dr. W. C. Nunn, Amon C. Carter Professor of American History at Texas Christian University, tells the story of the Southern Confederates who left home after the Civil War to found a new society in Mexico under Maximilian. Despite their hopes and plans, their venture failed. Professor Nunn utilizes contemporary sources, particularly newspapers, to add vividness to his account. The interesting sidelight on American history also points a moral to would-be escapists from reality.

SEA WAR. The Story of the U. S. Merchant Marine in World War II. By FELIX RIESENBERG, JR. (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1956. 302 pages, acknowledgement, bibliography and index, \$5.00).

This account of the war work of our merchant marine makes interesting reading for those interested in naval history. The author is worried because the merchant marine remains static while the United States Navy grows in strength. Here he sees a "foreboding parallel to Phoenicia, Rome, Spain and Holland—empires whose naval watchdogs were fed until they became larger than the thing they were supposed to attend, and eventually went down to defeat before aggressive nations whose lifeblood was ocean trade."

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of August, 1956, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Arab-Israeli Dispute

August 7—Jordan and Syria announce an agreement for economic union, including unified customs and currency, and unrestricted movement of citizens, residence, employment and capital.

Jordan charges that Israel has assembled the equivalent of a division in the Jerusalem area. Syria complains to the Security Council that Israel is violating armistice terms in the demilitarized zone.

August 8—Israel expresses "grave concern" about Syria's military preparations on Israel's northeastern frontier.

August 20—The Israeli-Jordanian Mixed Armistice Commission urges Jordan to stop Arab raids into Israeli territory.

August 26—Premier David Ben-Gurion declares that freedom of navigation for Israel through the Suez is a prerequisite to peace.

Espionage at the United Nations

August 24—A Russian translator working for the United Nations is dismissed because he tried to discover secret United States military information.

Nato

August 2—General Jean-Etienne Valluy is named Commander in Chief of the North Atlantic Central European forces, succeeding Marshal Alphonse-Pierre Juin.

August 3—The North Atlantic Council recommends that Iceland allow U. S. forces to remain on her territory.

August 7—An international convention goes into effect to protect art treasures in wartime. The convention sponsored by UNESCO will become operative when five countries ratify it.

August 24—U. S. authorities in Iceland an-

ounce a substantial reduction in Americans and Icelanders working on construction jobs at Keflavik airport.

The Suez Crisis

August 1—The U. S., Britain and France agree to a conference of those nations most concerned with the Suez Canal. The U.S.S.R. and Egypt are to be invited.

Dr. Mohammed Abu Nosseir, Egyptian Minister of Commerce, calls the first meeting of the Egyptian Suez Canal authority and then tours the Canal.

August 2—British Prime Minister Anthony Eden announces in the House of Commons that Queen Elizabeth will empower the Government to call up all organized reserve forces, more than 500,000.

The British Foreign Office warns British subjects to leave Egypt.

August 9—Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announces the creation of a National Liberation Army, incorporating the youth organization volunteers and the National Guard.

August 10—Britain, France and the U.S. circulate written proposals for solving the Suez problem to the nations preparing for the Conference.

The Egyptian Government announces that small arms production has been put on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

August 11—Great Britain rejects Moscow's recommendations to invite 22 other nations to the conference and to hold it later in the month. These suggestions and note are interpreted as Moscow's acceptance of the invitation to attend the conference.

August 12—Egypt refuses to confer on the Suez in London, calling the coming conference a conspiracy of "collective colonialism." The Egyptian President proposes instead a conference sponsored by Egypt.

August 13—The nine Arab League Nations promise that an attack on Egypt will be considered an attack on all League members.

August 16—The Egyptian government sponsors a 24-hour general strike to protest the opening of the Suez Conference in London.

22 nations open the Suez Conference in London.

August 21—An authoritative Egyptian spokesman declares that Egypt will negotiate on the future of the Canal if British and French military reinforcements are withdrawn.

The Western powers win a majority for their proposals to internationalize the Suez Canal.

August 22—Egypt threatens that if British and French ship pilots in the Canal quit their jobs, Egypt will give priority to all ships over those of Britain and France.

August 23—18 nations agree to ask Egypt to negotiate for international operation of the Suez Canal, as proposed by the U.S. and amended at the London Conference.

The U. S. International Cooperation Administration announces that no additional men will be sent to Egypt and no new projects will be started there until the Suez controversy is settled.

August 28—President Nasser agrees to meet with a 5-nation delegation, appointed by the London conferees, charged with presenting the United States proposal for international operation of the Suez Canal.

Egypt receives a loan of \$100 million from Saudi Arabia because of assets frozen in England and France.

August 29—Egypt charges that an alleged British spy ring discovered yesterday is part of a plot to overthrow the Nasser regime.

August 30—In retaliation for the dismissal of 2 British diplomats accused of spying by Egypt, Great Britain orders two Egyptians diplomats to leave.

The Permanent Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization schedules a meeting to discuss the Suez crisis.

ARGENTINA

August 2—Two Roman Catholic Right-wing

publications attack the Aramburu government order prohibiting military men from running for office.

August 15—Provisional President Pedro Eugenio Aramburu's Government arrests at least 20 persons suspected of plotting against the regime.

BELGIUM

August 2—The Belgian-Luxembourg economic union signs a short-term trade agreement with the Soviet Union, according to which Belgium and Luxembourg will export industrial equipment, spare parts for ships and steel rayon and fiber products. In exchange the two nations will get ores, fuel oil, steel products, aluminum, crude cotton, coal and wood.

BRAZIL

August 18—Finance Minister Jose Maria Alkmin declares that Brazil will continue to restrict coffee exports because of fluctuating prices.

August 24—Brazilian police seize the afternoon edition of the opposition newspaper *Tribuna da Imprensa*.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Ceylon

August 19—The Tamil federal party, a minority opposition group, threatens a non-violent direct action campaign if an autonomous state for Tamil-speaking people is not created within the next year as part of a federal union with Ceylon.

August 15—Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike announces that the U.S. will give Ceylon 20,000 tons of flour a year to provide free lunches for school children.

Great Britain

August 2—Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the Labor Opposition, supports Prime Minister Anthony Eden in a policy of firmness toward Egypt in the Suez crisis.

August 12—Britain begins to transport troops to the Middle East by air.

August 13—Hugh Gaitskell's Opposition de-

mands the recall of Parliament after the London Conference and criticizes the Government's militant attitude.

August 25—Hugh Gaitskell urges the Government to appeal to Suez Canal pilots to remain on their jobs.

India

August 6—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's Cabinet and the Congress party agree to the establishment of a new state of Bombay, to include the present Bombay and Saurashtra and Kutch, peopled mostly by the Gujarati, and Vidarbha, which is made up of the eight Maharashtrian districts of Madhya Pradesh. There will be about 4 million people in the new state, 55 per cent Maharashtrian and 35 per cent Gujarati. The Bombay dispute has arisen from conflict between these two peoples.

August 19—In a display of the power of non-violent resistance, students persuade the residents of Ahmadabad to stay indoors and refrain from work in protest against New Delhi's decision not to give the area a state of its own.

August 29—India signs a record food-loan agreement with the United States whereby India is to receive \$305 million worth of wheat, rice, cotton and other agricultural surplus items from the United States.

Pakistan

August 30—The Cabinet of Chief Minister Abu Hussain Sarkar of East Pakistan resigns because of splinter groups in the Assembly. The larger reason is that the Governor dissolved the budget session of the Assembly on August 13.

South Africa

August 25—In an application of the segregation laws, the Government notifies more than 100,000 non-whites that they must leave their homes in Johannesburg by August 3 of next year to make room for white residents.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Cyprus

August 16—The Greek Cypriote under-

SCIENCE and ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:

New Patterns of Living

By RICHARD L. MEIER, *Program of Education and Research in Planning, University of Chicago*. A provocative appraisal and synthesis of what is most promising in science and technology for world development. The author presents a new approach towards adequate levels of living for all parts of the world and carefully assesses future possibilities.

1956 266 pages \$6.00

Send today for an examination copy

Co-published by

The Technology Press
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.

440—4th Ave., New York 16, N. Y.

ground offers a military truce to Britain in leaflets distributed in Nicosia.

August 22—The British offer the terrorists three weeks to surrender with their arms; they may leave freely for Greece or remain in detention.

August 23—British surrender terms are rejected by the Greek Cypriote terrorists.

August 26—The British Government charges that the exiled Ethnarch of Cyprus, the Archbishop Makarios, personally directed the National Organization of Cypriote Fighters.

August 29—Two bombings on Cyprus end the truce as the underground National Organization of Cypriote Fighters vow the resumption of violence until the British resume negotiations with the exiled Archbishop Makarios.

The British Government refuses to negotiate directly with Archbishop Makarios in the settlement of Cypriote nationalists' demands.

Gibraltar

August 15—In a Colonial Office report for

1954 and 1955, Great Britain says that Spain is making a "determined attempt" "to harm the economy of the Rock in the belief that this would weaken the loyalty of its inhabitants."

Gold Coast

August 3—The Legislative Assembly votes unanimously to ask Britain for its independence. Thirty-two members of the Opposition who want a federal instead of a unitary state, boycott the session.

Malta

August 14—Malta asks British Prime Minister Anthony Eden to take steps in the "deteriorating state of affairs" in the island. Legislation providing for integration of Malta with Britain is to be introduced in the next session of the British Parliament.

August 17—The British Colonial Office announces that Britain will not give additional funds to Malta until the colony offers a financial statement.

August 21—The Colonial Office announces that Britain is sending \$1.4 million to Malta immediately for its financial needs in the next three months. Malta has furnished a financial statement to the Colonial Office. The British government plans to give Malta \$21 million for the next 18 months, and set up a commission to study the Colony's long-term needs; Malta has asked for \$24 million a year.

Nigeria

July 17—Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Prime Minister of the Eastern Region, cables Alan Lennox-Boyd, British Colonial Secretary, that he intends to resign because of the British investigation into charges that Azikiwe has "grossly misused" Government funds. He is charged with attempting to shift government funds into a local bank in which he is reported to have an interest, so that the bank can comply with a law regulating the proportion of loans to deposits.

BURMA

August 1—A Burmese official declares that Chinese Communist troops have been sta-

tioned 10 to 15 miles apart along a 500-mile arc inside Burma.

August 5—It is reported from Rangoon that Burma has disposed of all her surplus rice to Communist bloc nations in exchange for unneeded capital and consumer goods.

August 7—Premier Ba Swe insists that Chinese troops must be withdrawn before negotiations can begin to re-draw the Burmese-Chinese border.

CHILE

August 27—The reorganization of Chile's cabinet centers around the resignation of Minister of Finance Oscar Herrera. Four cabinet members are replaced in an attempt to dispel fears that the current economic stability will be upset by inflationary forces.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

August 4—The Peiping radio declares that Chinese Communist troops have occupied posts across the Burmese frontier.

August 6—The Government lifts the ban on visits from American newsmen after 7 years of restrictions.

August 15—A rail line connecting Yingtan, a Fukien province rail junction, with Nanping, is opened to traffic, providing logistical support for airfields opposite Taiwan (Formosa).

August 18—The Peiping radio announces that the Soviet Union and Communist China have agreed on joint development of the electric power potential of the Amur River Basin.

August 20—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India tells Parliament that he is considering a request from China to "neutralize" an area near the border of Tibet.

The U. S. State Department announces that President Eisenhower supports the State Department ban on travel to Communist China.

August 22—A U. S. Navy patrol plane is missing off the China coast after it was attacked by aircraft.

August 28—The Chinese Communist government informs the U. S. that its planes shot down an aircraft last week at about the

time and place where a U. S. Navy patrol plane was lost. The Peiping government asserts that it was a Nationalist Chinese plane.

COLOMBIA

August 17—President Gustavo Rojas Pinilla says that reports that he has turned over power to a military junta are "absurd rumors."

August 23—The Colombian government publishes the first issue of *Diario Oficial*, a Government-owned daily newspaper.

ECUADOR

August 7—It is reported in Quito that the Province of Manabi in western Ecuador is in revolt, led by defeated politicians and a rebellious army garrison.

August 8—The Government announces that the capital of Manabi Province, Portoviejo, has been recaptured and the rebels have fled.

August 30—The Cabinet of the new government of Camilo Ponce Enriquez is announced. The President-elect is to be inaugurated tomorrow.

EGYPT (see International, *the Suez Crisis*)

FRANCE

August 1—Premier Guy Mollet announces that the Government favors publication of personal income-tax returns.

THE FRENCH EMPIRE

Algeria

August 27—Marshal Alphonse-Pierre Juin proposes the grant of a good deal of internal autonomy to Algeria. Marshal Juin is regarded as a representative of the conservative French colonials.

French Togoland

August 10—Anani I. Santos, nationalist leader in the Togoland, charges that France is not acting in good faith in proposing a plebiscite to terminate the trusteeship and incorporate French Togoland into the French Union. The Togo-

landers are to vote on the issue in October.

August 14—The Territorial Assembly of French Togoland adds 20 amendments and then accepts the French Government's draft plan for French Togoland autonomy.

August 24—The French Cabinet approves a statute giving limited self-government to French Togoland.

GERMANY (East)

August 1—Communist party leader Walter Ulbricht reveals that election law changes will be made to ensure greater voter control to East German citizens.

GERMANY (West)

August 17—The Federal Constitutional Court outlaws the West German Communist party and its front organizations.

August 18—The Federal Minister for Refugees declares that about 330,000 Germans from Eastern Europe and the Balkans have asked permission to come to West Germany.

August 24—Dr. Otto John, former chief of the West German Office for the Protection of the Constitution, who fled to East Germany on July 20, 1954, and returned to West Germany 18 months later, is charged with treason after 8 months of investigation.

HONDURAS

August 1—An army barracks in the center of the capital city of Tegucigalpa revolts and is crushed after 3 hours of fighting.

August 2—A state of emergency is declared in the Department of Francisco Morazan, which includes Tegucigalpa.

HUNGARY

August 3—Heads of the Hungarian Government allow ordinary members of Parliament to question them during the Assembly session.

August 16—Dr. Endre Marton, Hungarian correspondent for A.P., is released after imprisonment since February, 1955, on charges of espionage.

INDONESIA

August 4—Indonesia repudiates more than \$1 billion in debts to The Netherlands.

August 14—In a conflict between the Government and Army officers, Army leaders order the arrest of Foreign Minister Ruslan Abdulgani. The order is countermanded by Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo.

August 26—President Sukarno leaves on a tour of the Soviet Union, Communist China, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Austria.

August 31—The Indonesian Cabinet approves the report of the Cabinet commission investigating the charges of corruption made by the Army against Foreign Minister Ruslan Abdulgani and orders him to join President Sukarno on his tour of the Soviet Union.

JAPAN

August 16—Japan and Indonesia sign an agreement providing that Japan will trade \$11.5 million of cotton textiles and yarns to Indonesia against payments in U. S. raw cotton available in Indonesia.

August 22—The deadlocked Japanese-Russian talks about a peace treaty to end World War II are postponed until after September, because Japan refuses to recognize Russian sovereignty over all the Kurile Islands.

JORDAN

August 27—Major General Ali Abu Nuwar, Chief of Staff to Jordan's Army, declares that in the event of war between Egypt and Great Britain the Arab world will ally itself with the Soviet Union. (See also **INTERNATIONAL, The Suez Crisis.**)

KOREA

August 15—Dr. Syngman Rhee is inaugurated for his third term as President of the eight-year-old Republic. John M. Chang, Opposition Democratic Leader, becomes Vice President and attacks the administration of 81-year-old President Rhee.

LEBANON

August 20—The Government orders legal measures drafted so it can seize foreign

oil pipelines unless the deadlock between the Government and the oil companies over tax payments is broken.

MOROCCO

August 19—Premier M'barek Bekkai, head of Morocco's coalition government, is criticized by the dominant Istiqlal (Independence) party for losing sight of its nationalist goals. The Istiqlal party is seeking to control all the administrative machinery of the government.

August 20—The Istiqlal party removes its ministers from the coalition government, thus creating the first political crisis since Morocco gained its independence from France in March of this year.

THE NETHERLANDS

August 22—The third attempt to solve the 10-week-old crisis in the Dutch cabinet fails when differences between the Labor party and the Catholic party over a tax cut to encourage savings prove insoluble.

August 23—The first break in the Labor-Catholic coalition government since the end of World War II threatens as Queen Juliana asks W. F. de Gaay Fortman of a minor Protestant party to try to form a cabinet.

POLAND

August 9—The Soviet Union offers Poland \$25 million in economic aid to help Poland better the living conditions of its workers.

SYRIA

August 4—Syrian President Shukry al-Kuwatly withdraws his resignation of yesterday on condition that no executions are enforced until further study. President al-Kuwatly refused to sign the death warrants of three National Socialists.

August 13—Syria warns Britain and the U. S. that a decision against the Suez seizure might precipitate sabotage to Western oil pipelines which Syria would be powerless to prevent, according to a Government spokesman.

August 19—Syria announces that Egypt and

Saudi Arabia have joined with her to agree to aid Jordan financially in its defense against Israel.

THE U.S.S.R.

August 1—A Moscow broadcast announces that Soviet aid was never solicited by Egypt for the construction of the Aswan High Dam.

August 9—Moscow will send representatives to the Suez talks but denies the legality of any steps which might be taken by the conferees towards the canal.

August 26—The U.S. reports that the Soviet Union has exploded a nuclear weapon in southwestern Siberia, and criticizes the secrecy of the experiments.

August 28—In order to increase labor's productivity, the Soviet Union reorganizes its wage system around piecework rates.

August 31—President Eisenhower announces a second Soviet nuclear explosion which took place again without prior notice.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

August 3—Soil bank payments this year total \$224 million to be paid to 495,432 farmers for taking out of production over 10 million acres of land.

August 23—The Department of Agriculture predicts that net farm income will rise this year because of higher farm prices and soil bank payments.

Civil Rights

August 3—The requirement that tenants in federally aided low cost housing must take a loyalty oath is dropped, the authority for such regulation having expired two years ago.

August 7—Robert G. Thompson, one of the 11 leading Communist leaders convicted under the Smith Act, is refused reinstatement of his disability pension by the Board of Veterans Appeals. Mr. Thompson received the Distinguished Service Cross for heroism in World War II.

All persons who have received instruction or assignments in espionage by a for-

ign government or political party are required to register with the Department of Justice under the new law of August 1.

August 11—The Subversive Activities Control Board conducting an investigation to determine whether or not the Communist party must register under the Internal Security Act of 1950 expunges the testimony of 3 witnesses accused of perjury. It must now decide on the basis of the remaining testimony whether or not the party is a Communist action organization.

August 16—The Communist party appeals the decision of the Subversive Activities Board not to reopen the case to hear new testimony.

August 24—The Justice Department asks the U. S. Court of Appeals to keep pro-segregationists from obstructing a local Arkansas school board trying to integrate its schools.

August 31—Governor Shivers of Texas sends Rangers into the town of Mansfield to help the local authorities keep law and order while 400 white residents of this town assemble on the high school grounds to prevent the enrollment of Negro students for the new term beginning September 4.

Economy

August 8—The Aluminum Company of America agrees to the same wage-benefit package that ended the recent steel strike in the settlement of the aluminum workers' strike.

August 19—Federal, state and local government spending is down 1 per cent in 1955 or \$109 billion, it is reported.

August 23—The Federal Reserve Board approves the sixth increase in 16 months in the discount rate, which is raised from two and three quarters to three per cent in an attempt to curb inflationary forces.

August 28—A budget surplus of \$707 million is expected by the end of the year, the Eisenhower Administration announces.

Foreign Policy

August 3—The Treasury permits Americans to resume business with the Egyptian government and its agencies.

August 10—General Gruenther, Commander

of NATO forces, flies here from Paris to discuss U. S. military manpower levels in Europe and the possibility of reducing forces in West Europe because of advances made in military technology.

August 14—The United States creates a Middle East Emergency Committee to take charge of supplying Western Europe with U. S. oil if shipments should be stopped during the present crisis.

President Eisenhower again extends an invitation to Prime Minister Nehru of India to discuss world problems. Nehru's original visit was postponed because of the President's abdominal operation.

August 25—Bullets discovered in a crewman's body evidence the fact that the Navy patrol plane which crashed into the East China Sea on Aug. 22 had been fired on. (For further information see CHINA.)

August 31—The U. S. intends to demand reparations for the Navy patrol plane shot down by Communist China.

Government

August 1—President Eisenhower signs the new Social Security bill providing for benefit payments to women at 62 rather than at 65, and to disabled workers at the age of 50.

A bill to liberalize the federal farm loan program becomes law.

August 3—Dr. Leroy E. Burney is appointed Surgeon General of the U. S. Public Health Service, a post vacated by Dr. Leonard Scheele in July.

August 6—President Eisenhower signs a late-session bill enabling the Federal Bureau of Investigation to enter a kidnapping case after a period of 24 hours instead of waiting 7 days.

August 7—J. Lee Rankin is to be the next Solicitor General of the U. S. He is taking Simon E. Sobeloff's place.

August 10—President Eisenhower vetoes a \$1.6 billion bill providing for the development of 99 river, harbor and flood control projects and 14 river basins. The veto is based on the fact that certain projects were not given the normal review required by law. No delay is involved because Congress only provided the authorizations and not the appropriations.

Military

August 3—Sergeant Matthew McKeon is cleared of manslaughter but is found guilty of negligent homicide in the drowning of 6 Marine recruits.

August 4—Sergeant McKeon is sentenced to 9 months at hard labor and receives a bad conduct discharge.

August 3—President Eisenhower signs a new \$2 billion military construction bill. The original bill was vetoed by the President because it provided for Congressional supervision over the administration in the enforcement of this bill. The new bill represents a compromise between legislative and executive control.

August 7—Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, returns original budgets for the coming fiscal year to the service chiefs, who are ordered to make drastic cuts.

August 26—The Air Force orders Reserve and Guard wings to ground all airline pilots, who are to be replaced by qualified reservists.

Politics

August 16—Adlai E. Stevenson is nominated as the Democratic presidential nominee on the first ballot by 905 and one-half votes to Governor Harriman's 210 votes.

August 17—Senator Estes Kefauver defeats Senator John Kennedy on the second ballot in a close race for the Democratic vice-presidential nomination.

August 17—President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon are unanimously re-nominated by the Republican Convention.

August 28—The executive council of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. votes to recommend that its general board endorse the Democratic candidates for president and vice-president, Adlai Stevenson and Estes Kefauver.

VIETNAM (North)

August 14—North Vietnam asks that a new Geneva conference be held on Indo-China if South Vietnam refuses to hold elections for unification of Vietnam under the 1954 Geneva conference.

American Farm Policy

September, 1956

A CURRENT HISTORY study of the problems facing the American farmer at mid-century. This will be particularly useful to those interested in campaign issues and to debaters discussing farm policies this year.

THE ROLE OF THE FARMER IN AMERICAN LIFE

By EARLE D. ROSS, Professor of History, Iowa State College

THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE AMERICAN FARM

By VERNON CARSTENSEN, Professor of History, University of Wisconsin

WHO SPEAKS FOR THE FARMER?

By WESLEY McCUNE, author of *The Farm Bloc*

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FARMER

By THEODORE SALOUTOS, Associate Professor of History, University of California

PRICE PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE

By IRENE TILL, Former Senior Economist, Federal Trade Commission

THE PROBLEM OF AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES

By JOHN D. BLACK, Professor of Economics, Harvard University

THE BRANNAN PLAN: The text of the recommendations presented by Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. Brannan to Congress on April 7, 1949, later known as "the Brannan Plan."

For the use of students and debaters, the editors have prepared a special DEBATE GUIDE, included without charge with each copy of this issue purchased. In orders of 5 or more, copies are available at 50¢ a copy; in orders of 10 or more, at 35¢ a copy; in orders of 30 or more, at 30¢ a copy; in orders of 100 or more, at 25¢ a copy. Single copy price, 65¢.

Current History • 108 Walnut Street • Philadelphia 6, Pa.

Timely **McGRAW-HILL** Books

SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICY

By **EVELINE M. BURNS**, Columbia University. **Economics Handbook Series.**
300 pages, \$5.50.

Provides analysis of the factors influencing policy decisions in the field of social security. While drawing illustrative material primarily from the American Social Security System, it introduces a great deal of comparative material, in order to show how other countries or different types of systems from those current in the U. S., have solved specific problems, or failed to solve them.

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By **RAYMOND F. MIKESELL**, University of Virginia, **Economics Handbook Series.** 341 pages, \$5.50.

Covers both the domestic economic interests and the political and security motives behind the major developments of U. S. international economic policies since World War I. Deals in great part with the modification of U. S. policies as necessitated by two post-war developments: (1) the unexpected severity of the world-wide economic dislocation and maladjustment, (2) the political development of the cold war with the USSR.

NATIONAL INCOME ACCOUNTS AND INCOME ANALYSIS

By **RICHARD RUGGLES**, Yale University; and **NANCY RUGGLES**. New Second Edition. 458 pages, \$6.50.

A simple and nontechnical, yet complete and rigorous, treatment of the national income concept based on the transactions of individual firms, government units, and households. This revision adds new material on structure and uses of national income accounts, on a simple system of sector accounts, on a comparison of U. S., U. N., and European accounts, on income aggregates, on index numbers, and on the determination of the equilibrium level of income in an economy.

AFL-CIO: LABOR UNITED

By **ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG**. IN PRESS.

This important new book gives an unusually clear and enlightening picture of the labor movement in the U. S. over the last 20 years, the steps which brought about the original AFL-CIO division; the attempts at reconciliation from 1938-1952. The influences bringing about the revival of unity talks and the famous No-Raiding agreement of 1953, and the events leading to AFL-CIO organic unity are graphically described. There are special chapters on the labor movement, discrimination, and a full and stimulating discussion of the significance of the merger and its implications for the future.

SEND FOR COPIES ON APPROVAL

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.

330 West 42nd Street : New York 36, N.Y.